In this paper I present and defend Rovelli's relation quantum mechanics (RQM) from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis a vis rival interpretations. In particular I will ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former). I then concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes).Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least insofar as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.

Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics GRW as an Ontology of Dispositions 1Mauro Dorato (Univ. of Rome 3), Michael Esfeld (Univ. Lausanne) 1.

This paper offers a critical assessment of the current state of the debate about the identity and individuality of material objects. Its main aim, in particular, is to show that, in a sense to be carefully specified, the opposition between the Leibnizian 'reductionist' tradition, based on discernibility, and the sort of 'primitivism' that denies that facts of identity and individuality must be analysable has become outdated. In particular, it is argued that-contrary to a widespread consensus-'naturalised' metaphysics supports both the acceptability of non-qualitatively grounded (both 'contextual' and intrinsic) identity and a pluralistic approach to individuality and individuation. A case study is offered that focuses on non-relativistic quantum mechanics, in the context of which primitivism about identity and individuality, rather than being regarded as unscientific, is on the contrary suggested to be preferable to the complicated forms of reductionism that have recently been proposed. More generally, by assuming a plausible form of anti-reductionism about scientific theories and domains, it is claimed that science can be regarded as compatible with, or even as suggesting, the existence of a series of equally plausible grades of individuality. The kind of individuality that prevails in a certain context and at a given level can be ascertained only on the basis of the specific scientific theory at hand.

No abstract

We discuss the three dominant models of the phenomenological literature pertaining to temporal consciousness, namely the cinematic, the retentional, and the extensional model. By relying on the distinction between acts and contents of consciousness we first discuss the explanatory merits of these three views vis à vis our temporal experience. In the second part of the paper, we review some relevant findings from the psychology and neuroscience of temporality in order to evaluate which of the three models of time consciousness is better confirmed from an empirical viewpoint. Depending on the time scale, all of the three models of temporal consciousness might be justified but we claim that the empirical evidence favours the extensional model, where the acts and contents of consciousness are both extended. The retentional model might apply to longer time intervals covered by working memory but, similarly to the cinematic model, it is open to the objection that from a neurophysiological point of view the brain processes which underlie acts of consciousness must necessarily be extended in time. We conclude by stressing a so-far neglected predictive component that is to be regarded as decisive for an understanding of our experience of temporality.