Emergent quantum indeterminacy

Abstract

Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy, which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.

Derivative Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Quantum Physics

“…The goal of this section is to show that her argument is inconclusive. Although replies to Barnes have already been offered (Eva [20], Mariani [28]), I will put forward a different line of resistance based on the observation that in general there are multiple ways of carving logical space compatibly with the evidence. Barnes' argument purports to show that derivative MI does not arise unless fundamental MI also arises.…”

“…4 For example, a particle in a superposition of position states has no determinate value of position. Although the interpretative details may differ depending on the philosophical methodology being employed, there appears to be a growing consensus that the failure of value definiteness constitutes evidence of MI (see Bokulich [9], Calosi & Mariani [10] [11], Calosi & Wilson [12] [13], Darby [16], Darby & Pickup [17], Fletcher & Taylor [23], Mariani [28], Skow [36], Torza [39] [40]).…”

Quantum Mechanics Without Indeterminacy

“…For a system like the particle considered above, its quantum state description will give rise to multiple determinates of the location determinable (each possessed to an extent less than 1). 21 Alternatively, one can adopt Albert and Loewer's fuzzy link and only attribute 20 For a defense of emergent quantum metaphysical indeterminacy, see Mariani (2021). 21 Barnes doesn't share Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy, however, one may develop an understanding of the vague link that fits with the metaphysical supervaluationist account.…”

Quantum indeterminacy

“…Variants of this argument are in Calosi and Mariani (2020), Calosi & Wilson (forthcoming), and Mariani (forthcoming).…”