Incompatibilism and personal relationships: another look at strawson's objective attitude

Shabo, Seth

doi:10.1080/00048402.2010.539621

Cited by 13 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…I don’t think we are. As Shabo points out, it is hard to define what it means to take something personally, but we can reliably recognize when someone has taken an affront personally and when she has not (2012a, 139). Suppose one victim of discriminatory hiring takes this offense personally, while another does not.…”

Section: A Defense Of Abolitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But others do not: feeling hurt, disappointed, or frustrated; wanting to understand the affront or to evaluate it; recognizing its significance for the particular relationship you have with the person. Even if taking personally requires that one care about an affront in an essentially backward-looking way (Shabo 2012a, 139), this does not imply that a disposition to resentment is partly constitutive of such caring (or of taking personally). Non-blaming disappointment and frustration are no less backward-looking than resentment.…”

Section: A Defense Of Abolitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, Shabo suggests that there is something special about personal relationships. He says that, ‘we can distinguish – at least in favourable cases – relationships of mature friendship and reciprocal love from associations based chiefly on mutual convenience or attraction, shared personal or professional interests, general collegiality or amiability, and so on’ (2012a, 133 n.5). I agree that we can distinguish these different types, but I contend that the PRA also applies to other relationships, if it applies at all.…”

Section: A Defense Of Abolitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5.Much more could be said about the Strawsonian project, but I will follow Shabo and focus on the PRA and the case for thinking that we cannot abandon the reactive attitudes (2012a, 132 n.4).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Section 1, I introduce the PRA and explain its importance for Strawson’s account. I focus in particular on Shabo’s (2012a and 2012b) formulation of this argument and explicate its key premises. In Section 2, I evaluate the argument, conclude that it is unsound, and identify what I take to be its weaknesses.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Reactive attitudes and personal relationships

Milam

2016

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim (a) that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and (b) that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that this objection exaggerates the role of the reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions.

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Section: A Defense Of Abolitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Defense Of Abolitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Defense Of Abolitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reactive attitudes and personal relationships

Milam

2016

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Inadequate Agency and Appropriate Anger

Brandenburg

2019

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Communication and cultivation accounts of responsibility (CC accounts) argue that blaming has an important communicative and agency-cultivating function when addressed at someone we consider to be deserving of blame. On these accounts, responsible agents are agents who can understand negative reactive attitudes and are (generally) sensitive to their moral-agency cultivating function. In this paper I examine our reproachful engagements with agents whose moral agency is underdeveloped or compromised. I discuss how these engagements compare to blaming on CC accounts and argue reproachful engagements can have an important communicative and agency-cultivating pointe. I then go on to propose an addition to CCaccounts that explains how underdeveloped and compromised agents can be held responsible. I will show how this addition resolves ambiguities in accounts from McKenna, Vargas and McGeer. I conclude the paper by anticipating an objection CC accounts could raise: that reproach and blame are co-extensive.

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Blaming friends

Scholten

2021

Philos Stud

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The aim of this paper is to shed light on the complex relations between friendship and blame. In the first part, I show that to be friends is to have certain evaluative, emotional and behavioral dispositions toward each other, and distinguish between two kinds of norms of friendship, namely friendship-based obligations and friendship-constituting rules. Friendship-based obligations tag actions of friends as obligatory, permissible or wrong, whereas friendship-constituting rules specify conditions that, if met, make it so that two persons stand in a particular type of relationship defined by various friendship-based obligations. I argue that whereas friendship-based obligations apply to actions under direct voluntary control, friendship-constituting rules apply to emotional and evaluative attitudes. The second part develops an account of friendship blame by comparing Scanlon’s account of blame with Wallace’s Strawsonian account of blame. I demonstrate that Scanlon’s account picks out responses that become appropriate when friends’ attitudes are not in agreement with friendship-constituting rules, whereas Wallace’s account picks out responses that become appropriate when friends violate friendship-based obligations. Arguing that the responses picked out by Scanlon’s account do not amount to blame, I show that, when combined, the views give an illuminating picture of possible reactions to friends who fall short of the standards of friendship.

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Incompatibilism and personal relationships: another look at strawson's objective attitude

Cited by 13 publications

References 5 publications

Reactive attitudes and personal relationships

Reactive attitudes and personal relationships

Inadequate Agency and Appropriate Anger

Blaming friends

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