Inadequate Agency and Appropriate Anger

Brandenburg, Daphne

doi:10.1007/s10677-019-09982-w

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Our paper conceptualizes nurturing reproach as therapeutic expression of negative affective responses to service users. A further conceptual question is whether these forms of reproach can ever be described as blaming or can be responses that track blameworthy persons (Brandenburg, 2019). In our interviews the clinicians insisted that they were not.…”

mentioning

confidence: 90%

Reproach without Blameworthiness

Brandenburg¹,

Strijbos²

2020

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology

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mentioning

confidence: 90%

Reproach without Blameworthiness

Brandenburg¹,

Strijbos²

2020

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology

Self Cite

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“…whether high stakes of getting it wrong can determine what counts as justification. The literature on pragmatism and 2 I will have to set aside complicated questions about which forms of criticism count as blame, as well as whether other responses like reproach should be considered a species of blame, or a distinct category altogether (Brandenburg, 2019). All that matters is that blame comes in a variety of forms, which can be stronger or weaker, and which are fitting responses to epistemically irresponsible agents depending on the nature of that agent's violation.…”

Section: Clarifying the Investigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

Piovarchy¹

2022

Preprint

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This paper introduces the concept of epistemic hypocrisy, arguing that agents who culpably violate an epistemic norm can lack the standing to blame other agents who culpably violate similar norms. After disentangling our criticism of epistemic hypocrites from various other fitting responses, I argue that a commitment account of standing to blame allows us to understand our objections to epistemic hypocrisy. Agents lack the epistemic standing to blame when they are not sufficiently committed to the norms they are blaming others for violating. This not only gives us a convincing account of epistemic standing to blame, it leaves us with a unified account of moral standing and epistemic standing. I also consider some potential asymmetries between the standing to engage in moral blame and the standing to engage in epistemic blame, arguing such asymmetries are either only apparent or can be explained away by extraneous factors.

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“…Even if the child's adoption of his bad motive fully employed his pertinent mental capacities, his malevolence is typically not considered, or at least arguably ought not to be deemed, as morally serious as that of an otherwise similar neurotypical adult (see also e.g. [49]). Similarly, even if Hannah's adoption of his bad motive fully employed her pertinent mental capacities that would not appear to warrant punishing her as harshly as Frank.…”

Section: Offenders' Motives Should Be Weighed In View Of Their Capaci...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Autism Spectrum Condition, Good and Bad Motives of Offending, and Sentencing

Varelius

2020

Neuroethics

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It has been proposed that the ways in which the criminal justice system treats offenders with Autism spectrum condition (ASC) should duly account for how the condition influences the offenders’ behavior. While the recommendation appears plausible, what adhering to it means in practice remains unclear. A central feature of ASC is seen to be that people with the condition have difficulties with understanding and reacting to the mental states of others in what are commonly considered as adequate ways. This article aims to clarify how the difficulties affect the moral weight to be given to the good and bad motives of offending in sentencing offenders with ASC. I start by explicating the main points of departure of the endeavor. After that I assess the moral significance of the good and bad motives of offenders with ASC in view of four cases and a comparison with how we commonly treat people who are not as able to understand and react to the mental states of others as neurotypical adults. I suggest that considerations pertaining to what has been called the primary orientation of morality provide grounds for deeming the good motives of offenders with ASC as morally significant as those of otherwise similar neurotypical offenders and the bad motives of offenders with ASC as less morally significant than those of otherwise similar neurotypical offenders. After considering three possible objections to the suggestion, I conclude by briefly elucidating its purported import.

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Inadequate Agency and Appropriate Anger

Cited by 9 publications

References 38 publications

Reproach without Blameworthiness

Reproach without Blameworthiness

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

Autism Spectrum Condition, Good and Bad Motives of Offending, and Sentencing

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