Reactive attitudes and personal relationships

Milam, Per‐Erik

doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1146032

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…The "cost" of rejecting basic desert and the moral practices based upon it has arguably gone down considerably in the light of recent work on the implications of "living without free will" (cf. Focquaert et al 2019, Levy 2011, Milam 2016, Pereboom 2001, Waller 2011 59. Moreover, if possibilists are engaged in de facto revisionism, then their lack of willingness to admit to this outright and deal with the consequences would make it reasonable to wonder whether they are also de facto proponents of Smilansky-style illusionism-for if they were illusionists, we could not be sure that they would admit it (cf.…”

Section: The Paradox Of Moral Luckmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck

Mickelson¹

2019

Midwest Stud Philos

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Section: The Paradox Of Moral Luckmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck

Mickelson¹

2019

Midwest Stud Philos

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“…Paul Russell (2010) argues that even if we came to interact with manipulated agents like Plum in the low number cases, we ought to take up a participant stance towards them (although the people responsible for the manipulation ought not to do so). However, whether the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation and anger really are necessary for normal, adult human relationships is highly contested; perhaps we could replace these attitudes with calmer and friendlier ones of, e.g., sadness and disappointment, and perhaps our relationships would be the better for it (see, for instance , Pereboom 2014;Sommers 2007;Milam 2016).…”

Section: How Ought We To Focus?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument

Jeppsson

2019

Philos Stud

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One of the most influential arguments against compatibilism is Derk Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument. Professor Plum, the main character of the thought experiment, is manipulated into doing what he does; he therefore supposedly lacks moral responsibility for his action. Since he is arguably analogous to an ordinary agent under determinism, Pereboom concludes that ordinary determined agents lack moral responsibility as well. I offer a hard-line reply to this argument, that is, a reply which denies that this kind of manipulation is responsibility undermining. I point out that fully fleshed-out manipulated characters in fiction can seem morally responsible for what they do. This is plausibly because we identify with such characters, and therefore focus on their options and the reasons for which they act rather than the manipulation. I further argue that we ought to focus this way when interacting with other agents. We have no reason to trust the incompatibilist intuitions that arise when we regard manipulated agents from a much more detached perspective.

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“…Second, while on my account of friendship, friends are typically open to experiencing second-personal reactive emotions with regard to each other, I will remain noncommittal about the question whether our involvement in personal relationships in general and friendships in particular entails our susceptibility to the reactive emotions Shabo (2012aShabo ( , 2012b. andCoates (2013) have argued that our involvement in personal relationships entails our susceptibility to the reactive emotions, whilePereboom (2001, 199-204),Sommers (2007) andMilam (2016) deny this.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Blaming friends

Scholten

2021

Philos Stud

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The aim of this paper is to shed light on the complex relations between friendship and blame. In the first part, I show that to be friends is to have certain evaluative, emotional and behavioral dispositions toward each other, and distinguish between two kinds of norms of friendship, namely friendship-based obligations and friendship-constituting rules. Friendship-based obligations tag actions of friends as obligatory, permissible or wrong, whereas friendship-constituting rules specify conditions that, if met, make it so that two persons stand in a particular type of relationship defined by various friendship-based obligations. I argue that whereas friendship-based obligations apply to actions under direct voluntary control, friendship-constituting rules apply to emotional and evaluative attitudes. The second part develops an account of friendship blame by comparing Scanlon’s account of blame with Wallace’s Strawsonian account of blame. I demonstrate that Scanlon’s account picks out responses that become appropriate when friends’ attitudes are not in agreement with friendship-constituting rules, whereas Wallace’s account picks out responses that become appropriate when friends violate friendship-based obligations. Arguing that the responses picked out by Scanlon’s account do not amount to blame, I show that, when combined, the views give an illuminating picture of possible reactions to friends who fall short of the standards of friendship.

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Reactive attitudes and personal relationships

Cited by 14 publications

References 16 publications

Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck

Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck

The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument

Blaming friends

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