IMPULSE CONTROL IN PIGEONS<sup>1</sup>

Ainslie, George

doi:10.1901/jeab.1974.21-485

Cited by 691 publications

(405 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(16 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

386

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Self-control is often referred to as the choice of a moredelayed outcome that is ultimately of more value over a less-delayed outcome that is ultimately of less value (Ainslie, 1974;Logue, 1988). Although this definition of self-control emphasizes the ability to restrain impulses for immediate gratification, it also incorporates elements of consideration of the future consequences of behaviourthus emphasizing the strategic nature of self-control.…”

Section: Self-controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although this definition of self-control emphasizes the ability to restrain impulses for immediate gratification, it also incorporates elements of consideration of the future consequences of behaviourthus emphasizing the strategic nature of self-control. Although self-control seems a feature that is unique to humans, many studies assert that animals are capable of self-control too, albeit to a lesser extent than humans (Ainslie, 1974). Despite its importance for engaging in the most profitable long-term scenario, animals and humans alike have difficulties in demonstrating self-control under uncertain conditions.…”

Section: Self-controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Evolved to satisfy our immediate needs: Self-control and the rewarding properties of food

Bos

Ridder

2006

Appetite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Evolutionary explanations of overeating in modern society emphasize that humans have evolved to eat to their physiological limits when food is available. The present paper challenges the idea that eating is driven by the availability of food only and proposes that it is regulated by strategic anticipatory behaviour in service of the most profitable long-term scenario as well. Our alternative explanation emphasizes the interaction between the reward system that regulates the liking and wanting of food and the role of self-control, which is involved in maintaining the best outcome in the long run. r

show abstract

Section: Self-controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Self-controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolved to satisfy our immediate needs: Self-control and the rewarding properties of food

Bos

Ridder

2006

Appetite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The Wrst is an inhibitory capacity that may be summarized as the exercise of self-control, often deWned as the suppression of immediate drives in favor of delayed rewards (e.g., Ainslie 1974;Mischel et al 1989). The second is a capacity to construct mental experiences of potential events, something that could be expressed as a projection of the self into possible future events, regularly referred to as mental time travel (e.g., Suddendorf and Busby 2005;Suddendorf andCorballis 1997, 2007;Tulving 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and orangutan (Pongo abelii) forethought: self-control and pre-experience in the face of future tool use

Osvath¹,

Osvath²

2008

Anim Cogn

298

250

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Planning for future needs has traditionally been considered to be restricted to human cognition. Although recent studies on great ape and corvid cognition challenge this belief, the phylogenesis of human planning remains largely unknown. The complex skill for future planning has not yet been satisfactorily established in any other extant primate species than our own. In humans, planning for future needs rely heavily on two overarching capacities, both of which lie at the heart of our cognition: self-control, often deWned as the suppression of immediate drives in favor of delayed rewards, and mental time travel, which could be described as a detached mental experience of a past or future event. Future planning is linked to additional high complexity cognition such as metacognition and a consciousness usually not attributed to animals. In a series of four experiments based on tool use, we demonstrate that chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo abelii) override immediate drives in favor of future needs, and they do not merely rely on associative learning or semantic prospection when confronted with a planning task. These results suggest that great apes engage in planning for the future by out competing current drives and mentally pre-experiencing an upcoming event. This suggests that the advanced mental capacities utilized in human future planning are shared by phylogenetically more ancient species than previously believed.

show abstract

“…However, using new tests such as the accumulation task, as well as tasks that make use of food exchanges to obtain delayed, more valuable rewards (e.g., Beran, Rossettie, & Parrish, 2016;Dufour, Pelé, Sterck, & Thierry, 2007;Dufour, Wascher, Braun, Miller, & Bugnyar, 2012;Pelé, Dufour, Micheletta, & Thierry, 2010), or tasks that require animals to move farther to obtain better rewards (e.g., Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005), or tasks that substitute tokens for food rewards (e.g., Jackson & Hackenberg, 1996;Judge & Essler, 2013), indicate that animals sometimes do show self-control and can delay gratification. In addition, varying aspects of experimental design shows that some species that normally are impulsive will make use of opportunities to force themselves to choose the later reward (Ainslie, 1974;Grosch & Neuringer, 1981;Rachlin & Green, 1972). Species differences also emerge on the same task and can be accounted for by differences in ecology (e.g., Stevens et al, 2005).…”

Section: Dealing With Fallibility: Strategic Delay Of Gratificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

To Err Is (Not Only) Human: Fallibility as a Window Into Primate Cognition

Beran¹

2017

CCBR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Human cognition affords our species an excellent toolbox for solving problems. Many nonhuman animal species appear to share with humans some of these tools. However, human cognition also is fallible. Susceptibility to perceptual illusions, misrepresentation of probabilities, cognitive biases, faulty memory, and heuristics all present sources of error from which behavior is suboptimal in the pursuit of goals. Some nonhuman species share these perceptual and cognitive biases with humans. Examples of this are described for nonhuman primates, ranging from perceptual illusions to humanlike failures on games of probability such as the Monty Hall Problem. Sometimes the performances of nonhuman primates mirror those of humans, but there are exceptions. Given that other species do experience things erroneously and make errors in judgment, it is an exciting question of whether they also might generate any strategies to offset their fallibility. Two examples to suggest that they do are provided from research with chimpanzees. One is of strategic self-distraction in the face of tempting rewards in a delay of gratification task. The other is of information-seeking behaviors in different contexts where chimpanzees have different types of information. This research, and that of many other groups, shows the value of examining perceptual and cognitive errors across species, and how different individuals and different species may be equipped psychologically to deal with the possibility of these errors occurring. Keywords: primate cognition, perception, illusions, self-control, metacognition IntroductionThe 20th century saw a shift in how humans thought about nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals), their behavior, and the cognitive processes that might underlie their behavior. Comparative cognition emerged as a strong discipline in the second half of the century, largely as a result of the broader cognitive revolution in human psychology, continued developments in ethology, and new opportunities to study a diverse range of species (Shettleworth, 2010). Earlier comparative psychologists certainly took an interest in aspects of cognition (see Dewsbury, 1984Dewsbury, , 2000Dewsbury, , 2013, but researchers in the second half of the century provided new approaches to understanding animal minds. Initially these approaches focused largely on traditional aspects of human cognitive psychology, including memory, perceptual capacities, and learning phenomenon (e.g., Honig & Fetterman, 1992;Hulse, Fowler, & Honig, 1978;Roitblat, Bever, & Terrace, 1984), as they might reflect the use of mental representations and other information-processing approaches for interacting with the world. Later, 58COMPARATIVE COGNITION & BEHAVIOR REVIEWS Beran research increasingly focused on questions that covered nearly every topic found in a human cognitive psychology textbook, and even questions that were not typically discussed in such sources (e.g., theory of mind, deception, mind reading, cooperative decision making, metacognition, mental time travel, and ot...

show abstract

IMPULSE CONTROL IN PIGEONS¹

Cited by 691 publications

References 17 publications

Evolved to satisfy our immediate needs: Self-control and the rewarding properties of food

Evolved to satisfy our immediate needs: Self-control and the rewarding properties of food

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and orangutan (Pongo abelii) forethought: self-control and pre-experience in the face of future tool use

To Err Is (Not Only) Human: Fallibility as a Window Into Primate Cognition

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

IMPULSE CONTROL IN PIGEONS1

Cited by 691 publications

References 17 publications

Evolved to satisfy our immediate needs: Self-control and the rewarding properties of food

Evolved to satisfy our immediate needs: Self-control and the rewarding properties of food

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and orangutan (Pongo abelii) forethought: self-control and pre-experience in the face of future tool use

To Err Is (Not Only) Human: Fallibility as a Window Into Primate Cognition

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

IMPULSE CONTROL IN PIGEONS¹