Summation and numerousness judgments by 2 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) were investigated when 2 quantities of M&Ms were presented sequentially, and the quantities were never viewed in their totality. Each M&M was visible only before placement in 1 of 2 cups. In Experiment 1, sets of 1 to 9 M&Ms were presented. In Experiment 2, the quantities in each cup were presented as 2 smaller sets (e.g., 2 + 2 vs. 4 + 1). In Experiment 3, the quantities were presented as 3 smaller sets (e.g., 2 + 2 + 3 vs. 3 + 4 + 1). In Experiment 4, an M&M was removed from 1 set before the chimpanzees' selection. In Experiments 1 and 2, the chimpanzees selected the larger quantity on significantly more trials than would be predicted by chance. In Experiments 3 and 4, 1 chimpanzee performed at a level significantly better than chance. Therefore, chimpanzees mentally represent quantity and successfully combine and compare nonvisible, sequentially presented sets of items.

Two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) made numerousness judgments of nonvisible sets of items. In Experiment 1, 1-10 items were dropped 1 at a time into an opaque cup, and then an additional 1-10 items were dropped 1 at a time into another opaque cup. The chimpanzees' performance levels were high and were more dependent on factors indicative of an analogue-magnitude mechanism for representation of set size than on an object file mechanism. In Experiment 2, a 3rd visible set was made available after the sequential presentation of the first 2 sets. The chimpanzees again performed at high levels in selecting the largest of the 3 sets. In Experiment 3, 1 of the 2 initially presented sets was reduced in number by the sequential removal of 1, 2, or 3 items. Both chimpanzees performed above chance levels for the removal of 1, but not more than 1, item.

Results that point to animals’ metacognitive capacity bear a heavy burden given the potential for competing behavioral descriptions. This article uses formal models to evaluate the force of these descriptions. One example is that many existing studies have directly rewarded so-called “uncertainty” responses. Modeling confirms that this practice is an interpretative danger because it supports associative processes and encourages simpler interpretations. Another example is that existing studies raise the concern that animals avoid difficult stimuli not because of uncertainty monitored but because of aversion given error-causing or reinforcement-lean stimuli. Modeling also justifies this concern and shows that this problem is not addressed by the common practice of comparing performance on Chosen and Forced trials. The models and related discussion have utility for metacognition researchers and theorists broadly because they specify the experimental operations that will best indicate a metacognitive capacity in humans or animals by eliminating alternative behavioral accounts.

Although researchers are exploring animals' capacity for monitoring their states of uncertainty, the use of some paradigms allows the criticism that animals map avoidance responses to error-causing stimuli not because of uncertainty monitored but because of feedback signals and stimulus aversion. The authors addressed this criticism with an uncertainty-monitoring task in which participants completed blocks of trials with feedback deferred so that they could not associate reinforcement signals to particular stimuli or stimulus-response pairs. Humans and 1 of 2 monkeys were able to make cognitive, decisional uncertainty responses that were independent of feedback or reinforcement history within a task. This finding unifies the comparative literature on uncertainty monitoring. The dissociation of performance from reinforcement has theoretical implications, and the deferred-feedback technique has many applications.

Four chimpanzees were highly accurate in selecting the larger of two concurrent accumulations of bananas in two opaque containers over a span of 20 min. One at a time, bananas were placed into the containers, which were outside the chimpanzees' cages. The chimpanzees never saw more than one banana at a time, and there were no cues indicating the locations of the bananas after they were placed into the containers. The performance of these animals matched that of human infants and young children in similar tests. The chimpanzees were successful even when the sets to be compared were sufficiently large (5 vs. 8, 5 vs. 10, and 6 vs. 10) to cast doubt on the possibility that the chimpanzees were using an object file mechanism. These chimpanzees are the first nonhuman animals to demonstrate extended memory for accumulated quantity.

Two rhesus monkeys selected the larger of two sequentially presented sets of items on a computer monitor. In Experiment 1, performance was related to the ratio of set sizes, and the monkeys discriminated between sets with up to 10 items. Performance was not disrupted when 1 set had fewer than 4 items and 1 set had more than 4 items, a critical trial type for differentiating object file and analog models of numerical representation. Experiment 2 controlled the interitem rate of presentation. Experiment 3 included some trials on which number and amount (visual surface area) offered conflicting cues. Experiment 4 varied the total duration of set presentation and the duration of item visibility. In all of the experiments, performance remained high, although total set presentation duration also acted as a partial cue for the monkeys. Overall, the data indicated that rhesus monkeys estimate the approximate number of items in sequentially presented sets and that they are not relying solely on nonnumerical cues such as rate, duration, or cumulative amount.

It is unknown whether animals, like humans, can employ behavioural strategies to cope with impulsivity. To examine this question, we tested whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) would use self-distraction as a coping strategy in a situation in which they had to continually inhibit responses to accumulating candies in order to earn a greater amount of those rewards. We tested animals in three conditions in which they were sometimes given a set of toys and were sometimes allowed physical access to the accumulating candies. Chimpanzees allowed the rewards to accumulate longer before responding when they could divert their attention to the toys, and they manipulated the toys more when the candies were physically accessible. Thus, chimpanzees engaged in self-distraction with the toys when such behaviour was most beneficial as a coping mechanism.

Categorization is essential for survival, and it is a widely studied cognitive adaptation in humans and animals. An influential neuroscience perspective differentiates in humans an explicit, rule-based categorization system from an implicit system that slowly associates response outputs to different regions of perceptual space. This perspective is being extended to study categorization in other vertebrate species, using category tasks that have a one-dimensional, rule-based solution or a two-dimensional, information-integration solution. Humans, macaques, and capuchin monkeys strongly dimensionalize perceptual stimuli and learn rule-based tasks more quickly. In sharp contrast, pigeons learn these two tasks equally quickly. Pigeons represent a cognitive system in which the commitment to dimensional analysis and category rules was not strongly made. Their results may reveal the character of the ancestral vertebrate categorization system from which that of primates emerged. The primate results establish continuity with human cognition, suggesting that nonhuman primates share aspects of humans' capacity for explicit cognition. The emergence of dimensional analysis and rule learning could have been an important step in primates' cognitive evolution.