Dissociating uncertainty responses and reinforcement signals in the comparative study of uncertainty monitoring.

Abstract

Although researchers are exploring animals' capacity for monitoring their states of uncertainty, the use of some paradigms allows the criticism that animals map avoidance responses to error-causing stimuli not because of uncertainty monitored but because of feedback signals and stimulus aversion. The authors addressed this criticism with an uncertainty-monitoring task in which participants completed blocks of trials with feedback deferred so that they could not associate reinforcement signals to particular stimuli or stimulus-response pairs. Humans and 1 of 2 monkeys were able to make cognitive, decisional uncertainty responses that were independent of feedback or reinforcement history within a task. This finding unifies the comparative literature on uncertainty monitoring. The dissociation of performance from reinforcement has theoretical implications, and the deferred-feedback technique has many applications.

Not knowing what one knows: A Meaningful failure of metacognition in capuchin monkeys.

“…Yet again, humans ( Figure 2A) and monkeys ( Figure 2B) displayed an increase in the use of the UR corresponding with a decrease in use of the categorization responses for the most difficult trials. Other experiments explored metacognition in rhesus monkeys and showed that the use of the UR or other metacognitive responses transfers across a variety of different tasks (Basile, Schroeder, Brown, Templer, & Hampton, 2015;Brown, Templer, & Hampton, 2017;Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007;Smith, Redford, Beran, & Washburn, 2010;Templer & Hampton, 2012) and that monkeys will continue using the UR when feedback is delayed (Smith, Beran, Redford, & Washburn, 2006), minimizing the likelihood that task-specific environmental cues are responsible for the use of the UR. Figure 1. A.…”

Reinforcement and Metacognition

“…Delaying reinforcement by giving trials in blocks with the reinforcement at the end, as Smith et al (2006) did in an ingenious experiment, doesn't really solve the problem. The procedure simply impairs the correlation between real uncertainty (assessed by actual percent correct) and the animal's assessment of uncertainty (assessed by its choice of the uncertain response).…”

“…First, it may not be possible to use such procedures with other species. It is pretty amazing that one of monkeys from the Smith et al (2006) study continued to respond in the new task despite the withholding of explicit reinforcers; we doubt that rats or pigeons would be so obliging. Second, complex as it is, the procedure does not eliminate reinforcement.…”

“…Hence, using complex procedures, such as the one developed by Smith et al (2006) or Beran et al (2006), will just make the life of the researchers unnecessarily complicated. First, it may not be possible to use such procedures with other species.…”

The Curious Incident of the Capuchins

“…Macaques do not need trial-by-trial reinforcement to make adaptive uncertainty responses (Couchman et al, submitted;Smith et al, 2006) because uncertainty responses are decisional processes that are not dependent on reinforcement history and conditioning feedback. Macaques do not need their uncertainty responses to bring any immediate, tangible reward because uncertainty-definitionally and psychologically-is not a reactive, reward-based phenomenon.…”