Improving Remote Voting Security with CodeVoting

Abstract

Abstract. One of the major problems that prevents the spread of elections with the possibility of remote voting over electronic networks, also called Internet Voting, is the use of unreliable client platforms, such as the voter's computer and the Internet infrastructure connecting it to the election server. A computer connected to the Internet is exposed to viruses, worms, Trojans, spyware, malware and other threats that can compromise the election's integrity. For instance, it is possible to write a virus that changes the voter's vote to a predetermined vote on election's day. Another possible attack is the creation of a fake election web site where the voter uses a malicious vote program on the web site that manipulates the voter's vote (phishing/pharming attack). Such attacks may not disturb the election protocol, therefore can remain undetected in the eyes of the election auditors.We propose the use of CodeVoting to overcome insecurity of the client platform. CodeVoting consists in creating a secure communication channel to communicate the voter's vote between the voter and a trusted component attached to the voter's computer. Consequently, no one controlling the voter's computer can change the his/her's vote. The trusted component can then process the vote according to a cryptographic voting protocol to enable cryptographic verification at the server's side.

A new secure Internet voting protocol using Java Card 3 technology and Java information flow concept

“…In this case, any form of security devised for the overall online voting system, finally, will be defeated by the user's PC . Accordingly, some solutions have been proposed for better security in online voting : In the first approach that is unique to electronic voting (not practical for Internet voting); voters are required to cast the ballet from a private voting booth.In the second approach , a combination of public key cryptography, smart cards, and financial transactional IC card reader (FINREAD) terminal readers are employed with the purpose of implementing a trusted computing environment within the voter's insecure system. According to financial transactional IC card reader framework, security is ensured through three components: a secure display, a secure pin pad, and a card reader authentication function .…”

“…The greatest challenge for securing the entire voting protocol (process) is the insecurity of client‐side PCs that may be infected with many types of programs and malicious codes (or botnet network) . In many of the existing protocols, there is a false assumption that client systems are secure .…”

Privacy and verifiability in voting systems: Methods, developments and trends

“…[JRF10,HS07,HRT10]. The central idea has also been further explored for online voting systems, such as Pretty Good Democracy (PGD [HRT10]).…”

Pretty Understandable Democracy - A Secure and Understandable Internet Voting Scheme

“…In the code sheets, candidates are assigned to random, unique codes, thus voters cast codes rather than candidates. Code voting has been extended in [16], [19], [17], [18], [20], [13], [14], [15] and [26]. The schemes in [6], [16], and [19] assume the voter to be honest in order to ensure secrecy.…”

“…The schemes in [6], [16], and [19] assume the voter to be honest in order to ensure secrecy. Other extensions of code voting, [17], [18], [20] assume a trustworthy voting-and voterspecific smart card for secrecy and integrity. All these schemes do not satisfy our security model, because one entity (either voter or smart card) can violate secrecy or integrity.…”