Implementation and Participation in China's Local Environmental Politics: Challenges and Innovations

Kostka, Genia; Mol, Arthur P.J.

doi:10.1080/1523908x.2013.763629

Cited by 181 publications

(102 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Improving water governance is not just about simply changing particular rules, but is more importantly related to who participates and how to participate [27]. Although "participation gap" is a common governance issue [28], some empirical research has showed that local activity would neither increase the local decision-making power nor decrease the national power [29]. Multi-dimensional involvement, in terms of different levels, sectors and scales [30], could help resolve some of the conflicts [31].…”

Section: Water Governance Network Governance and Ecology Of Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative Environmental Governance, Inter-Agency Cooperation and Local Water Sustainability in China

Huang

Chen

et al. 2017

Sustainability

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Administrative fragmentation among government agencies has posed a significant challenge to environmental governance. However, few studies have theoretically examined and empirically measured how local governments in China address this with collaborative approaches. Informed by the ecology of games framework (EGF), this paper examined the status of inter-agency water governance in Dongguan City: the pilot city of aquatic ecologically friendly city of China. The research question we seek to address is: What are the main characteristics of the water governance network in local China? With empirical data collected via survey questionnaires and semi-structured in-depth interviews following the EGF, we find that local agencies have realized the need for cooperation in water resource management. However, they were not substantially familiar with each other in the local policy network, failing to reach their full potential in collaboration. Social network analysis was used to analyze the collaborative network. We found that the network has a weak to moderate density, allowing for collective action problems and leading to insufficient cooperative governance. The network has presented central actors with strong bridging capital to control information and resource flows. We also find strong bonding capital among some policy actors as shown in high reciprocity, clustering coefficient and transitivity. To strengthen the effectiveness of local water governance, efforts should be made to establish a functional department and extend the boundary of collaborative network.

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Section: Water Governance Network Governance and Ecology Of Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative Environmental Governance, Inter-Agency Cooperation and Local Water Sustainability in China

Huang

Chen

et al. 2017

Sustainability

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“…on developing environmental insurances, opening up environmental information for the public, developing plans for low carbon society, and major investments in renewable energy), and proclaimed priority of ecological civilization by the new leadership. But it is also widely reported that these national plans and ideas meet structural barriers, difficulties and obstructions in their local implementation (Kostka and Mol, 2013).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rural industries have been and still are notorious for their air and water pollution, for their inefficient use and waste of natural resources, for the destruction of the ecological environment and for damaging human health (Zhang, 2002). Many studies ascribe the poor environmental performance of SMEs to the sheer number and dispersement, the substandard production technology, their poor operation and management systems and routines, the shortage of finances, the lack of environmental awareness, and last but not the least: the strong local governmenteSME alliance (Guo and Zheng, 2012;Kostka and Mol, 2013). Rural SMEs continue to be notorious polluters, regardless of specific efforts and campaigns, such as the massive 1997 SME closure campaigns (Xu et al, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why small and medium chemical companies continue to pose severe environmental risks in rural China

Zhang

Mol

et al. 2014

Environmental Pollution

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a b s t r a c tIn China, rural chemical SMEs are often believed to still largely operate below the sustainability radar. This paper investigates to what extent and how chemical SMEs are already experiencing pressure to improve their environmental performance, using an in-depth case study in Jasmine County, Hebei province. The results show that local residents had rather low trust in the environmental improvement promises made by the enterprises and the local government, and disagreed with the proposed improvement plans. Although the power of local residents to influence decision making remained limited, the chemical SMEs started to feel increasing pressures to clean up their business, from governments, local communities and civil society, and international value chain stakeholders. Notwithstanding these mounting pressures chemical SME's environmental behavior and performance has not changed radically for the better. The strong economic ties between local county governments and chemical SMEs continue to be a major barrier for stringent environmental regulation.

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“…There is also limited access to environmental litigation justice, which limits industrial company awareness of environmental and social liabilities. Meanwhile, due to the weak enforcement of laws (Kostka and Mol 2013), the penalty for not buying pollution insurance is very low for industrial enterprises. As a result, companies will not spend money on pollution insurance.…”

Section: Local Pollution Insurance Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance in China: In Need of Strong Government Backing

Feng

Mol

Lü

et al. 2013

AMBIO

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Environmental pollution liability insurance was officially introduced in China only in 2006, as part of new market-based approaches for managing environmental risks. By 2012, trial applications of pollution insurance had been launched in 14 provinces and cities. More than ten insurance companies have entered the pollution insurance market with their own products and contracts. Companies in environmentally sensitive sectors and high-risk industries bought pollution insurance, and a few successful compensation cases have been reported. Still, pollution insurance faces a number of challenges in China. The absence of a national law weakens the legal basis of pollution insurance, and poor technical support stagnates further implementation. Moreover, current pollution insurance products have limited risk coverage, high premium rates, and low loss ratios, which make them fairly unattractive to polluters. Meanwhile, low awareness of environmental and social liabilities leads to limited demand for pollution insurance products by industrial companies. Hence, the pollution insurance market is not yet flourishing in China. To improve this situation, this economic instrument needs stronger backing by the Chinese state.

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Implementation and Participation in China's Local Environmental Politics: Challenges and Innovations

Cited by 181 publications

References 25 publications

Collaborative Environmental Governance, Inter-Agency Cooperation and Local Water Sustainability in China

Collaborative Environmental Governance, Inter-Agency Cooperation and Local Water Sustainability in China

Why small and medium chemical companies continue to pose severe environmental risks in rural China

Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance in China: In Need of Strong Government Backing

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