The rapid development of proteomics studies has resulted in large volumes of experimental data. The emergence of big data platform provides the opportunity to handle these large amounts of data. The integrated proteome resource, iProX (https://www.iprox.cn), which was initiated in 2017, has been greatly improved with an up-to-date big data platform implemented in 2021. Here, we describe the main iProX developments since its first publication in Nucleic Acids Research in 2019. First, a hyper-converged architecture with high scalability supports the submission process. A hadoop cluster can store large amounts of proteomics datasets, and a distributed, RESTful-styled Elastic Search engine can query millions of records within one second. Also, several new features, including the Universal Spectrum Identifier (USI) mechanism proposed by ProteomeXchange, RESTful Web Service API, and a high-efficiency reanalysis pipeline, have been added to iProX for better open data sharing. By the end of August 2021, 1526 datasets had been submitted to iProX, reaching a total data volume of 92.42TB. With the implementation of the big data platform, iProX can support PB-level data storage, hundreds of billions of spectra records, and second-level latency service capabilities that meet the requirements of the fast growing field of proteomics.

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Research summary: We contribute to the corporate political activity (CPA) literature by showing that investors value companies that host visits of high‐ranking government officials (President and Premier). We argue that investors may value host official visits for two reasons: (1) the signal received about possibility of firm accessing government‐controlled resources via promotion or protection; and (2) the certification effect from such high‐powered visitors elevating the firm's reputation and legitimacy. Results from an event study analysis of 84 high‐ranking government official visits in China from 2003 to 2011 indicate that investors responded positively to host firms as reflected by stock market performance. Furthermore, the greatest positive reactions accrued to firms experiencing weaker prior period financial performance and to firms that are privately compared to state‐controlled. Managerial summary: Do visits by high‐ranking government officials influence firm stock market performance? Studying a sample of Chinese public firms that hosted 84 visits by the Chinese President and the Premier from 2003 to 2011, we find that investors reacted positively to such visits compared with a group of non‐host firms from the same industry and with similar financial performance and size. In addition, firms with weaker prior financial performance and private firms benefit the most from hosting such visits. Our findings imply that hosting visits of high‐ranking government officials can signal future government‐controlled resource inflows and boost host firms' reputation and legitimacy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Administrative fragmentation among government agencies has posed a significant challenge to environmental governance. However, few studies have theoretically examined and empirically measured how local governments in China address this with collaborative approaches. Informed by the ecology of games framework (EGF), this paper examined the status of inter-agency water governance in Dongguan City: the pilot city of aquatic ecologically friendly city of China. The research question we seek to address is: What are the main characteristics of the water governance network in local China? With empirical data collected via survey questionnaires and semi-structured in-depth interviews following the EGF, we find that local agencies have realized the need for cooperation in water resource management. However, they were not substantially familiar with each other in the local policy network, failing to reach their full potential in collaboration. Social network analysis was used to analyze the collaborative network. We found that the network has a weak to moderate density, allowing for collective action problems and leading to insufficient cooperative governance. The network has presented central actors with strong bridging capital to control information and resource flows. We also find strong bonding capital among some policy actors as shown in high reciprocity, clustering coefficient and transitivity. To strengthen the effectiveness of local water governance, efforts should be made to establish a functional department and extend the boundary of collaborative network.

In the context of multilevel governance, collaboration among governmental and non-governmental entities across different levels of government is increasingly popular in China’s environmental governance. Policy actors are engaged in two types of collaboration with other local governments: horizontal and vertical collaboration. Policy actors participate in horizontal collaboration when they work with entities at the same level, and in vertical collaboration when working with governments at different levels. This study examines multilevel environmental governance in China by studying how the decisions of policy actors to participate in local water governance networks are influenced by vertical pressures from higher level government and horizontal influences from other policy actors at the same level. We approach the research questions in the empirical context of local water governance in Dongguan city of Guangdong Province. With survey data collected from 31 municipal departments, 32 town governments, nine water-related private businesses and five NGOs, we tested the hypotheses with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The results indicate that vertical pressure and horizontal brokerage are both drivers for participation in the local water governance network.