Intravisit and intervisit measurements of peripapillary RNFL thickness and ONH parameters with Cirrus HD-OCT showed excellent reproducibility, indicating that this instrument may be useful in monitoring glaucoma progression. When comparing two measurements from the same eye on two different visits, a reproducible decrease in average RNFL thickness of approximately 4 μm or more may be considered a statistically significant change from baseline.

Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance can impinge on top managers' feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers' likelihood of financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager's perspective and questions one of agency theory's foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers reduces the potential for moral hazard. Managerial SummaryMany of us are familiar with stories about top managers 'cooking the books' in one way or another. As a result, companies and regulatory bodies often implement strict controls to try to prevent financial fraud. However, cognitive evaluation theory describes how those external controls could actually have the opposite of their intended effect because they rob managers of their intrinsic motivation for behaving appropriately. We find this to be the case. When top managers face more stringent external control mechanisms, in the form of activist shareholders, the threat of a takeover, or zealous securities analysts, they are actually more likely to engage in financial misbehavior. Running title: External Corporate Governance and Financial Fraud 3Strategy scholars and policymakers have devoted renewed attention in recent years to 'external' mechanisms of corporate governance, such as the monitoring and control by stakeholders that are not inside the organization. For example, a recent review of this literature seeks to 'bring external corporate governance into the corporate governance puzzle' more fully (Aguilera et al., 2015).Governance research has yielded important insights about these external governance mechanisms (Coffee, 2006), but few have considered their potentially adverse ramifications. Toward this end, we incorporate a behavioral perspective of managers into our understanding of external governance to highlight how the expectations imposed by external governance could impose on managers' motivation, and we thus uncover the potential harm such governance mechanisms might introduce.

Research summary:This study proposes that CEOs may undertake intensive acquisition activities to increase their social recognition and status after witnessing their competitors' winning CEO awards. Using a sample of U.S. S&P 1,500 firm CEOs, we find that CEOs engage in more intensive acquisition activities in the period after their competitors won CEO awards (i.e., postaward period), compared to the preaward period. Moreover, this effect is stronger when focal CEOs themselves had a high likelihood of winning CEO awards. Our findings also show that acquisitions by focal CEO firms in the postaward period realize lower announcement returns compared to acquisitions by the same CEOs in the preaward period. Managerial summary:Each year a few CEOs receive CEO awards from business media and CEOs who receive such awards become instant celebrities, that is, superstar CEOs. This study explores how superstar CEOs' competitors react to not winning CEO awards. We find that superstar CEOs' competitors undertake more intensive acquisition activities in the postaward period compared to the preaward period. This is particularly true for competitors who were close, yet did not win CEO awards. In addition, acquisitions by superstar CEOs' competitors are associated with lower announcement returns in the postaward compared to the preaward period. These findings collectively indicate that acquisitions may be used as a channel for superstar CEOs' competitors to elevate their own social status, but at a cost to shareholders.

PURPOSE To compare the late complications in the Ahmed Baerveldt Comparison Study during 5 years of follow-up. DESIGN Multicenter, prospective, randomized clinical trial. METHODS SETTINGS Sixteen international clinical centers. STUDY POPULATION Two hundred seventy six subjects aged 18 to 85 years with previous intraocular surgery or refractory glaucoma with intraocular pressure of > 18 mmHg. INTERVENTIONS Ahmed Glaucoma Valve FP7 or Baerveldt Glaucoma Implant BG 101-350. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES Late postoperative complications (beyond 3 months), reoperations for complications, and decreased vision from complications. RESULTS Late complications developed in 56 subjects (46.8 ± 4.8 5 year cumulative % ± SE) in the Ahmed Glaucoma Valve group and 67 (56.3 ± 4.7 5 year cumulative % ± SE) in the Baerveldt Glaucoma Implant group (P = 0.082). The cumulative rates of serious complications were 15.9% and 24.7% in the Ahmed Glaucoma Valve and Baerveldt Glaucoma Implant groups respectively (P = 0.034) although this was largely driven by subjects who had tube occlusions in the two groups (0.8% in the Ahmed Glaucoma Valve group and 5.7% in the Baerveldt Glaucoma Implant group, P = 0.037). Both groups had a relatively high incidence of persistent diplopia (12%) and corneal edema (20%), although half of the corneal edema cases were likely due to pre-existing causes other than the aqueous shunt. The incidence of tube erosion was 1% and 3% in the Ahmed Glaucoma Valve and Baerveldt Glaucoma Implant groups, respectively (P = 0.04). CONCLUSIONS Long term rates of vision threatening complications and complications resulting in reoperation were higher in the Baerveldt Glaucoma Implant than the Ahmed Glaucoma Valve group over 5 years of follow-up.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

Aims To compare the outcomes of neovascular glaucoma (NVG) treated with and without intravitreal bevacizumab in a large case comparison study. Methods The study is a retrospective, comparative, case series of 163 eyes of 151 patients with NVG, including 99 treated without and 64 treated with intravitreal bevacizumab. Medical and surgical treatments for NVG were assessed. The main outcome measures were visual acuity (VA) and intraocular pressure (IOP).Results At the time of NVG diagnosis, the median VA was count fingers (CF) in the non-bevacizumab group and 2/300 in the bevacizumab group. IOP (mean ± SD) was 43.1 ± 13.0 mm Hg in the non-bevacizumab group and 40.8 ± 11.5 mm Hg in the bevacizumab group. IOP (mean ± SD) decreased to 18.3 ± 13.8 mm Hg in the nonbevacizumab group and 15.3 ± 8.0 mm Hg in the bevacizumab group, and the median VA was CF in both treatment groups at a mean follow-up of 12 months. Panretinal photocoagulation (PRP) substantially reduced the need for glaucoma surgery (Po0.001) in bevacizumab treated NVG eyes. Conclusions Although bevacizumab delayed the need for glaucoma surgery, PRP was the most important factor that reduced the need for surgery. Vision and IOP in eyes with NVG treated with bevacizumab showed no long-term differences when compared with eyes that were not treated with bevacizumab. Thus, intravitreal bevacizumab serves as an effective temporizing treatment, but is not a replacement for close monitoring and definitive treatment of NVG. PRP remains the treatment modality that affects the course of NVG in terms of decreasing the need for surgery to control IOP.