This study reviews recent research building on Hambrick and Mason’s [Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9: 193–206] upper echelons (UE) perspective with the aim of identifying challenges and opportunities for future UE-based organizations research. Our review highlights a number of central facets of the UE perspective: It is at once a theoretical framework predicting that organizations will be a reflection of their top management teams and a methodology that relies on executive demography as a measurement proxy for underlying individual and group cognitions and behaviors. In proposing new research directions, we challenge organizations researchers to (1) reconsider the universality of the top management team (TMT) construct, (2) carefully explore the practical and theoretical meaning of TMT demographic characteristics vis-à-vis the deeper constructs they are presumed to proxy, (3) integrate other determinants of managerial cognition and behavior into UE theorizing, and (4) revisit the roles of causality and intertemporal dynamics among the antecedents, consequences, and composition of top management teams.

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We develop resource-and dynamic capability-based arguments that CEOs with international assignment experience (IAE) create value for the firm and themselves through their control of a valuable, rare, and inimitable resource. Supporting this view, U.S. multinationals performed better with an international assignment-experienced CEO at the helm, especially when such human capital was bundled with other organizational resources and capabilities. Moreover, in highly global firms, CEOs with IAE appropriated a greater proportion of performance in their pay.

New business models combined with a lack of objective operating data result in significant information asymmetry and uncertainty in the valuation of new firms in emerging markets. Information asymmetry increases the risks of both adverse selection and moral hazard. When traditional differentiators of firm quality are lacking, such as in emerging economic sectors, markets may turn to secondary information sources to filter and sort firms. We investigate the roles played by observable corporate governance characteristics as indirect indicators of new firms' potential qualitative differences. Markets may sort firms based on such characteristics because they are perceived to be correlated with desired but unobservable characteristics and actions and they lower the risks of both adverse selection and moral hazard. Our study of publicly traded U.S. Internet firms found that firm market valuation was strongly associated with corporate governance characteristics (e.g., executive and director stock-based incentives, institutional and blockholder stock ownership, board structure, and venture capital participation). In addition, firm age moderated how markets used some quality proxies to determine firm valuation during the post-IPO period.

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