Impediments to accurate clinical judgment and possible ways to minimize their impact.

Arkes, Hal R.

doi:10.1037/0022-006x.49.3.323

Cited by 296 publications

(225 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(40 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

212

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The pairs of P(D IH) and P(DI-H) that are the crux ofthe DD and QD research are simply two of the marginal probabilities of that 2 X 2 table. It is commonly believed that a major contributor to the illusory correlation effect is the tendency of subjects to discount as irrelevant all cause-absent data (Arkes, 1981). This strategy leaves the subject with the information needed to construct P(D IH) but not with the information needed to construct P(D I-H), which is consistent with our explanation of the pseudodiagnosticity effect.…”

Section: Relation To Other Laboratory Taskssupporting

confidence: 79%

“…Another related phenomenon that is readily observed in the laboratory is illusory correlation, one manifestation of which is the tendency to report relationships when none exists (Arkes, 1981;Chapman & Chapman, 1969;Crocker, 1981). The DD and QD experimental paradigms bear a close formal relation to the typical illusory correlation paradigm.…”

Section: Relation To Other Laboratory Tasksmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

On people’s understanding of the diagnostic implications of probabilistic data

et al. 1996

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Two lines of prior research into the conditions under which people seek information are examined in light of two statistical definitions of diagnosticity. Five experiments are reported. In two, subjects selected information in order to test a hypothesis. In the remaining three, they selected information in order to convince someone else of the truth of a known hypothesis. A total of 567 university students served as subjects. The two primary conclusions were as follows: (l) When the task is highly structured by the environment, subjects select information diagnostically, and (2) when the task is less structured, so that subjects must seek relevant information not manifest, they select information pseudodiagnostically. Possible relations to other laboratory inference tasks and to clinical judgment are discussed.

show abstract

Section: Relation To Other Laboratory Taskssupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Relation To Other Laboratory Tasksmentioning

confidence: 99%

On people’s understanding of the diagnostic implications of probabilistic data

et al. 1996

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Clinical experts often show overconfidence in initial diagnoses (Arkes, 1981), which can lead to an increased focus on the most probable diagnostic category. Hence, it was important in the present study to compare expert and novice confidence in category identification and examine its effects on multiple-category reasoning.…”

Section: Construction Of Case Vignettesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clinical expertise and reasoning with uncertain categories

Hayes

Chen

2008

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…A few suggestions do exist for how forensic clinicians might consider the impact of bias, such as actively generating alternative conclusions, identifying and using relevant base rates, minimizing the role of memory, and identifying and weighing the most valid sources of data (Arkes, 1981;Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988;Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Forensic psychologists’ perceptions of bias and potential correction strategies in forensic mental health evaluations.

Neal¹,

Brodsky²

2016

Psychology, Public Policy, and Law

109

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A qualitative study with 20 board-certified forensic psychologists was followed up by a mail survey of 351 forensic psychologists in this mixed-methods investigation of examiner bias awareness and strategies used to debias forensic judgments. Rich qualitative data emerged about awareness of bias, specific biasing situations that recur in forensic evaluations, and potential debiasing strategies. The continuum of bias awareness in forensic evaluators mapped cogently onto the "stages of change" model. Evaluators perceived themselves as less vulnerable to bias than their colleagues, consistent with the phenomenon called the "bias blind spot." Recurring situations that posed challenges for forensic clinicians included disliking or feeling sympathy for the defendant, disgust or anger toward the offense, limited cultural competency, preexisting values, colleagues' influences, and protecting referral streams. Twenty-five debiasing strategies emerged in the qualitative study, all but one of which rated as highly useful in the quantitative survey. Some of those strategies are consistent with empirical evidence about their effectiveness, but others have been shown to be ineffective. We identified which strategies do not help, focused on promising strategies with empirical support, discussed additional promising strategies not mentioned by participants, and described new strategies generated by these participants that have not yet been subjected to empirical examination.Finally, debiasing strategies were considered with respect to future directions for research and forensic practice.

show abstract

Impediments to accurate clinical judgment and possible ways to minimize their impact.

Cited by 296 publications

References 29 publications

On people’s understanding of the diagnostic implications of probabilistic data

On people’s understanding of the diagnostic implications of probabilistic data

Clinical expertise and reasoning with uncertain categories

Forensic psychologists’ perceptions of bias and potential correction strategies in forensic mental health evaluations.

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About