The judge or jury makes a subjective determination of when an expert is credible. However, no published measure exists for assessment of the credibility of expert witnesses. The current study addressed this gap by developing and cross-validating the Witness Credibility Scale (WCS). Drawing on the narrative literature, we hypothesized that credibility was a product of four factors: "likeability," "believability," "trustworthiness," and "intelligence." A 41-item measure was initially constructed based on successive iterations of ratings by a panel of judges using items from the Osgood Semantic Differential measure and was subsequently administered to 264 undergraduates. A factor analysis of the data yielded a factor structure that consisted of four factors labeled, "knowledge," "likeability," "trustworthiness," and "confidence." The final version of the WCS used 20 adjectives with four subscales of five items, each subscale reflecting high loadings on the respective factors. The scale was then tested in five additional studies, in which the scale successfully differentiated between groups of videotaped experts testifying in manipulated conditions. The empirical data from these studies permit a foundation for comparing outcome data in future research investigations.

A qualitative study with 20 board-certified forensic psychologists was followed up by a mail survey of 351 forensic psychologists in this mixed-methods investigation of examiner bias awareness and strategies used to debias forensic judgments. Rich qualitative data emerged about awareness of bias, specific biasing situations that recur in forensic evaluations, and potential debiasing strategies. The continuum of bias awareness in forensic evaluators mapped cogently onto the "stages of change" model. Evaluators perceived themselves as less vulnerable to bias than their colleagues, consistent with the phenomenon called the "bias blind spot." Recurring situations that posed challenges for forensic clinicians included disliking or feeling sympathy for the defendant, disgust or anger toward the offense, limited cultural competency, preexisting values, colleagues' influences, and protecting referral streams. Twenty-five debiasing strategies emerged in the qualitative study, all but one of which rated as highly useful in the quantitative survey. Some of those strategies are consistent with empirical evidence about their effectiveness, but others have been shown to be ineffective. We identified which strategies do not help, focused on promising strategies with empirical support, discussed additional promising strategies not mentioned by participants, and described new strategies generated by these participants that have not yet been subjected to empirical examination.Finally, debiasing strategies were considered with respect to future directions for research and forensic practice.

The current study investigated citizen reactions to notifications of sex offenders in the neighborhood, in an effort to determine whether sex offender notification laws are accomplishing their goal of increased protective actions against sex offenses. Lazarus's stress and coping theory provided the theoretical framework for the study. Telephone surveys were conducted with 250 Alabama residents who were notified of an offender in the neighborhood. Questions were posed regarding notification importance, fear of crime, coping, and locus of control. Notification importance predicted fear of crime, which, in turn, predicted coping. Fear of crime did not mediate the relation between notification importance and coping, however. Finally, situational locus of control did not moderate the relation between fear of crime and coping strategy.

Little empirical research has addressed the effects of psychological or psychosocial evidence on sentencing decisions. The present study found that death-qualified mock jurors were more likely to sentence a defendant to death without mitigating evidence than in a case with mitigating evidence present. Mock jurors were less likely to assign a death sentence in cases that contained one of the following types of mitigating evidence: The defendant was (i) diagnosed with schizophrenia, not medicated, and suffered from severe delusions and hallucinations, (ii) drug addicted and high at the time of the murder, (iii) diagnosed as borderline mentally retarded during childhood, or (iv) severely physically and verbally abused by his parents during childhood.

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