Our system is currently under heavy load due to increased usage. We're actively working on upgrades to improve performance. Thank you for your patience.
2008
DOI: 10.3758/pbr.15.5.1002
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Clinical expertise and reasoning with uncertain categories

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1
1

Citation Types

4
21
0

Year Published

2010
2010
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
8

Relationship

1
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 24 publications
(25 citation statements)
references
References 18 publications
4
21
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Thus, for this paradigm, a reasonable estimate of how often people are integrating across categories (rather than simply averaging any numbers that are displayed) is 25–40%. This is similar to estimates of effects in category-based induction, which also vary across paradigms and between labs, depending on details of the problems and subject populations (Hayes and Chen, 2008; Hayes and Newell, 2009; Murphy and Ross, 2010b). Thus, although people tend to pay more attention to the alternative category than they generally do in category-based induction tasks, the rate of multiple-category use once these unthinking instances of it are excluded does not seem very different in these two tasks.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 69%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Thus, for this paradigm, a reasonable estimate of how often people are integrating across categories (rather than simply averaging any numbers that are displayed) is 25–40%. This is similar to estimates of effects in category-based induction, which also vary across paradigms and between labs, depending on details of the problems and subject populations (Hayes and Chen, 2008; Hayes and Newell, 2009; Murphy and Ross, 2010b). Thus, although people tend to pay more attention to the alternative category than they generally do in category-based induction tasks, the rate of multiple-category use once these unthinking instances of it are excluded does not seem very different in these two tasks.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 69%
“…Previous research in a related field, category-based induction, has found that people often only consider a single category when making predictions based on category information despite clearly knowing that the categorization was uncertain (Murphy and Ross, 1994; Hayes and Chen, 2008; Hayes and Newell, 2009; Murphy et al, 2012). Malt et al (1995), Ross and Murphy (1996), and Hayes and Chen (2008) used vignettes about real-life situations to study induction when categorization is uncertain. For example, one vignette might describe an unknown person who was most likely to be a real estate agent (the target category) but who could have been a cable repair worker or—in a different condition—a burglar (the secondary category).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Importantly, this pattern was not because clinicians essentialized categories less overall, in that clinicians and laypeople similarly endorsed the presence of causal essences in medical disorders and other types of categories outside of the expert's domain of expertise. This finding is similar to work showing that clinical experience promotes reasoning differently about categories, but only in the specific domain of expertise (Hayes & Chen, 2008).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 88%
“…By comparing these predictions across subjects who received different alternative categories, we could evaluate whether the categories had the expected effects. In fact, under most conditions, people's answers to these predictions do not differ across these two groups [6], [7], [8]. That is, once people decide that the person in white is most likely the nurse, it makes no difference whether the person might instead be an orderly or doctor, even though the probability of the alternative category ranged from 25–50% (as rated by other subjects).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%