Images and Kant&amp;#x2019;s Theory of Perception

Matherne, Samantha

doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.029

Cited by 13 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…In the secondary literature, compare Grüne (2009: 26, 29, 160ff. ), who maintains that "blind" empirical intuitions can only be made into conscious objective representations through the sensible synthesis of the imagination that makes intuitions "clear"; for views more similar to the present, see Matherne (2015) and Tolley (2017). that to have an empirical intuition of sense, "the object must be represented as present," which sets it off from "an image [Einbildung] as intuition without the presence of the object" (R6315, 18:619).…”

Section: Images Without Empirical Intuitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

Tracz¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The role of intuition in Kant's account of experience receives perennial philosophical attention. In this essay, I present the textual case that Kant also makes extensive reference to what he terms "images" that are generated by the imagination. Beyond this, as I argue, images are fundamentally distinct from empirical and pure intuitions. Images and empirical intuitions differ in how they relate to sensation, and all images (even "pure images") actually depend on pure intuitions. Moreover, all images differ from intuitions in their structure or format. I then turn to a question that naturally arises on the resulting view: if the imagination produces images, and if images are fundamentally distinct from intuitions, then how do intuitions relate to the imagination? I outline reasons for thinking that intuitions and their essential features do not depend on the imagination at all. Though this essay does not decisively argue for this thesis, the resulting view provides a clear account of the distinction between the senses and the imagination in Kant's theory of sensibility. K ant famously argues that objects are "given to us" in intuitions and "thought" through concepts, and that both intuitions and concepts are required for "experience" (A50-51/B74-75, A92-3/B125). 1 Kant's bold claims about the opposition between intuition and concept (and between the faculties of sensibility and Contact: R. Brian Tracz

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Section: Images Without Empirical Intuitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 Some interpreters 2. See the extensive account of the role of images in Kant's theory of perception by Matherne (2015); see also Tolley (2019). See Makkreel (1994: ch.…”

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Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

Tracz¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…Though the account of images thus ultimately remains somewhat unclear, the attention paid to the significance of this representation‐type in Kant's theory of cognition is welcome and overdue. (See (Matherne ) for another helpful entry on this subject. )…”

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The role of imagination in cognition: On Horstmann's expansive reading of Kant. Kant's Power of Imagination, by Rolf‐PeterHorstmann. Cambridge University Press, 2018, 110pp. ISBN: 978‐1108464031 £15.00

Choi

2020

European J of Philosophy

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In Kant's Power of Imagination, Rolf-Peter Horstmann defends the bold thesis that it is the imagination, not the understanding, that "carries the main burden in the laborious process" of cognition: it is the imagination that transforms "amorphous and unstructured physiological sense impressions" into intuitions (100); and it is the imagination-this time, working alongside and sharing "equal weight" with the understanding (78)-that generates "representations of full-blown cognitive objects," i.e., cognitions, from intuitions (100). 1 This interpretation casts not just Kant's theory of imagination but also the Critical account of cognition as a whole in a new light, and it usefully counterbalances the many readings of Kant that focus narrowly on the logical processes that underwrite cognition.There is a second way in which Horstmann's book is notably bold. For it demotes, if not eschews, some of the scholarly priorities that have become the norm in Kant studies. There is no exhaustive compiling and weighing of textual evidence and counterevidence, and only highly selective engagement with the secondary literature. 2 Instead, readers are given a comprehensive (if still schematic) analysis of the role of imagination in the cognitive process, as well as an account of the development of Kant's views on the subject from the 1781 Critique of Pure Reason through the 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment-all in just 102 pages, set with a generously sized font and written from a perspective informed by current debates in the philosophy of mind. In Horstmann's words, the project is an "immanent and a reconstructive endeavor, relying solely on Kant's own resources" (3), 3 but it is perhaps more informative to note that he readily admits to the absence of unequivocal textual evidence for some of his claims, even allowing at one point that "one has to be quite imaginative in one's reconstruction in order to find support" for his view (45; also 32, 37, 46); and that he once introduces a topic by saying he will "elaborate how Kant might be thinking about this…, or, more precisely, how I would proceed, if I were Kant" (34n31). Horstmann thus clearly signals to the reader that his interpretation is at times liberally "reconstructive," and though Horstmann takes it to remain on solid ground textually, his priorities explicitly lie with "point[ing] out illuminating consequences" of the view "instead of defending[it] against potentially recalcitrant textual evidence" (46). This approach is an unconventional one, and it makes for a book that is thoroughly original and thought-provoking, but also hard to know how to engage with. 4 Traditional forms of textual bandying, for instance, seem ineffectual, or at least contrary to the spirit of Horstmann's undertaking. The difficulty of approaching this kind

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“…One could, however, object that the debate is not well‐formed and emphasize the importance of including, e.g., schemata, in the discussion of the relationship between concept possession and perceptual experience. For a discussion of schemata in the generation of perceptual ‘images’, see Matherne (), cf. Griffith () and Williams ().…”

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“…See Longuenesse's () discussion of concepts as rules for sensible synthesis (50 ff). See also Anderson (), Land (), and Matherne (). Watkins (, 519–20) also suggests an imagistic view, though it is not fully articulated.…”

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The Kantian (Non)‐conceptualism Debate

McLear

2014

Philosophy Compass

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One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a "conceptualist" account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy.

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Images and Kant’s Theory of Perception

Cited by 13 publications

References 11 publications

Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

The role of imagination in cognition: On Horstmann's expansive reading of Kant. Kant's Power of Imagination, by Rolf‐PeterHorstmann. Cambridge University Press, 2018, 110pp. ISBN: 978‐1108464031 £15.00

The Kantian (Non)‐conceptualism Debate

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