Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

Abstract

The role of intuition in Kant's account of experience receives perennial philosophical attention. In this essay, I present the textual case that Kant also makes extensive reference to what he terms "images" that are generated by the imagination. Beyond this, as I argue, images are fundamentally distinct from empirical and pure intuitions. Images and empirical intuitions differ in how they relate to sensation, and all images (even "pure images") actually depend on pure intuitions. Moreover, all images differ from intuitions in their structure or format. I then turn to a question that naturally arises on the resulting view: if the imagination produces images, and if images are fundamentally distinct from intuitions, then how do intuitions relate to the imagination? I outline reasons for thinking that intuitions and their essential features do not depend on the imagination at all. Though this essay does not decisively argue for this thesis, the resulting view provides a clear account of the distinction between the senses and the imagination in Kant's theory of sensibility. K ant famously argues that objects are "given to us" in intuitions and "thought" through concepts, and that both intuitions and concepts are required for "experience" (A50-51/B74-75, A92-3/B125). 1 Kant's bold claims about the opposition between intuition and concept (and between the faculties of sensibility and Contact: R. Brian Tracz