The Kantian (Non)‐conceptualism Debate

McLear, Colin

doi:10.1111/phc3.12166

Cited by 47 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Nor does it claim that individual intuitions would be impossible without acts of synthesis (cf. McLear, 2014;Tolley, 2013). Nor does the account deny that temporally extended sequences of intuition could be produced without a contribution from the understanding-intuitions could be placed in a temporal sequence by merely associative processes (cf.…”

Section: Acknowledgementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Hutton

2018

European J of Philosophy

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In the “Second Analogy,” Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal ordering of representations necessary, thus enabling objective representational purport. One exegetical question that remains controversial is this: how, and in what sense, does deploying the concept of cause render a certain ordering of representations necessary? I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic normativity: with certain causal presuppositions in place, the individual is obliged to make a judgment with certain temporal contents, on pain of irrationality. To make this normatively obligatory judgment, the subject must place her perceptual representations in a certain order. This interpretation fits Kant's text, his argumentative aims, and his broader views about causal inference, better than rival interpretations can. This result has important consequences for the ongoing debate over the role of normativity in Kant's philosophy of mind.

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Section: Acknowledgementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…128-132) attempt to repair Beck's epistemic reading. McLear, 2014;Tolley, 2013). Allais, 2009;Tolley, 2013).…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Hutton

2018

European J of Philosophy

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“…Kant's idea seems to be that sensibility and understanding employ different modes of representing: Whereas in intuitions 1 , several representations are given 'in one 14. For an overview of the debate about (non-)conceptualism see McLear (2014) and Allais (2016).…”

Section: (Prol 4:306)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptualizing Kant’s Mereology

Marschall¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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In the Resolution of the Second Antinomy of the first Critique and the Dynamics chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences, Kant presents his critical views on mereology, the study of parts and wholes. He endorses an unusual position: Matter is said to be infinitely divisible without being infinitely divided. It would be mistaken to think that matter consists of infinitely many parts-rather, parts "exist only in the representation of them, hence in the dividing". This view, according to which parts are created through division somehow, was criticized as obscure early on, and has not received much attention since. Against this trend, I show how a coherent position, which I call Mereological Conceptualism, can be extracted from the sparse textual basis. There was a time when the dispute respecting monads employed such general attention, and was conducted with so much warmth, that it forced its way into company of every description, that of the guard-room not excepted. There was scarcely a lady at court who did not take a decided part in favour of monads or against them. In a word, all conversation was engrossed by monads-no other subject could find admission. [...] As this controversy has made a great deal of noise, you will not be displeased, undoubtedly, if I dwell a little upon it.

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“… 1 For an overview of the debate, see McLear (2014). The non-conceptualist interpretation is typically associated with Robert Hanna (2005, 2008) and Lucy Allais (2009, 2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…B151-2), and to suggest that the type of synthesis for which the first premise is true is different to the type of synthesis for which the second premise true. I follow Lucy Allais (2017) andColin McLear (2015) in questioning the evidence that Kant accepts the second premise of the argument. In the first edition transcendental deduction, Kant writes that 'for unity of intuition to come from this manifold … the running-through and then taking-together of this manifoldness is necessary, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension' (A99).…”

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Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Non-Conceptualism, and the Fitness-for-Purpose Objection

Watt

2018

Kantian rev.

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The subject of this article is a powerful objection to the non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. Part of the purpose of the deduction is to refute the sort of scepticism according to which there are no objects of empirical intuition that instantiate the categories. But if the non-conceptualist interpretation is correct, it does not follow from what Kant is arguing in the transcendental deduction that this sort of scepticism is false. This article explains and assesses a number of possible responses to this objection.

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The Kantian (Non)‐conceptualism Debate

Cited by 47 publications

References 103 publications

Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Conceptualizing Kant’s Mereology

Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Non-Conceptualism, and the Fitness-for-Purpose Objection

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The Kantian (Non)‐conceptualism Debate

Cited by 47 publications

References 103 publications

Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Conceptualizing Kant&#x2019;s Mereology

Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Non-Conceptualism, and the Fitness-for-Purpose Objection

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Conceptualizing Kant’s Mereology