‘I did it my way’: customisation and practical compliance with EU policies

Abstract

By tackling shared problems through concerted policies, the European Union (EU) is thought to have a superior output legitimacy. However, EU policies change as they are being 'customised' during the implementation process. How do such patterns of 'differentiated implementation' affect EU governance in practice? While some studies highlight the danger of 'watering down' the objectives of EU law, others emphasise the role of decentralised problem-solving. We analyse how customisation affects states' practical compliance with EU anti-discrimination, environmental, and justice and home affairs directives in 27 member states (excluding Croatia) between 2007 and 2013. The findings show that customised density (higher number of rules than prescribed by the EU directives) reduces practical compliance. Conversely, customised restrictiveness (stricter requirements than the EU directives) improves practical compliance. In contrast to earlier implementation research, we conclude that literal implementation is not the best form to ensure practical implementation.

Management of Waste Batteries and Accumulators: Quest of European Union Goals

“…Despite some studies on the energy management of batteries and accumulators [12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20], there is a research gap regarding how the EU Member States implement Directive 2006/66/EC provisions. We also point out, similar to Thomann and Sager [21], that although the compliance of Member States' activities with the EU policies and laws is the subject of many studies, the research is often characterised by a strong focus on the legal conformance with the EU, e.g., [22,23]. However, this focus is insufficiently accounting for the implications of the EU's multilevel governance structure.…”

Differentiated integration and flexible implementation

“…Allowing for differentiation, either through DI or through FI, is a way to soften the impact of EU-level arrangements on 'outlying' member states (cf. Bellamy and Kröger 2017, Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012: 295, and Lord 2015Hartmann 2016, Thomann 2015, and Zhelyazkova and Thomann 2021.…”

“…Sebastiaan Princen, Frank Schimmelfennig, Ronja Sczepanski, Hubert Smekal and Robert Zbiral The effects of FI on compliance have been studied as part of the literature on discretion in EU law. These studies have taken different operationalizations of (non-)compliance, such as delays in transposition (Kaeding 2008;Thomson et al 2007), numbers of infringement procedures (Thomson et al 2007), evaluation reports (Zhelyazkova 2013;Zhelyazkova et al 2016;Zhelyazkova and Thomann 2021) and primary sources (Thomson 2007, who uses the data collected by Falkner et al 2005). Most studies largely find a positive effect of FI on compliance: if a (provision in a) directive offers more discretion, member states are more likely to comply (Thomson 2007;Thomson et al 2007;Zhelyazkova 2013;Zhelyazkova et al 2016;Zhelyazkova and Thomann 2021; for an overview, see Treib 2014: 21).…”

“…These studies have taken different operationalizations of (non-)compliance, such as delays in transposition (Kaeding 2008;Thomson et al 2007), numbers of infringement procedures (Thomson et al 2007), evaluation reports (Zhelyazkova 2013;Zhelyazkova et al 2016;Zhelyazkova and Thomann 2021) and primary sources (Thomson 2007, who uses the data collected by Falkner et al 2005). Most studies largely find a positive effect of FI on compliance: if a (provision in a) directive offers more discretion, member states are more likely to comply (Thomson 2007;Thomson et al 2007;Zhelyazkova 2013;Zhelyazkova et al 2016;Zhelyazkova and Thomann 2021; for an overview, see Treib 2014: 21). This makes sense, because the range of compliant member state practices is wider if EU law offers more flexibility and because flexible provisions are less likely to cause opposition from outlying member states.…”

“…FI arguably serves many of the same purposes as DI. By allowing member states room to make choices during implementation, differences between member states can be taken into account (Hartmann 2016;Thomann 2015;Zhelyazkova and Thomann 2021). Moreover, giving this flexibility may facilitate decision-making on EU-level measures when member states cannot agree on one set of uniform standards (Andersen and Sitter 2006: 321).…”