<i>Aristotle's Physics I, II</i>

Charlton, William; Greenberg, Daniel

doi:10.1063/1.3022435

Cited by 10 publications

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“…Psychologists who wish to teach this material themselves may find it useful to focus on the causal notions of Aristotle (Charlton, 1970) and David Hume (1739/1927, given that these two positions form the basis for much of the subsequent disagreement over causality (see Winston, 1987). Excellent general discussions of causality are available (e.g., Bunge, 1959;Mackie, 1974).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Cause and Experiment in Introductory Psychology: An Analysis of R.S. Woodworth's Textbooks

Winston

1988

Teaching of Psychology

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This article analyzes the emerging notion of experimental method and its relationship to causality in the various editions of R. S. Woodworth's (1921, 1929, 1934, 1940; Woodward & Marquis, 1947) widely used introductory psychology textbook. Beginning with the 1934 edition, experiment was defined as manipulating an independent variable, while holding all other variables constant, and observing the effects on a dependent variable. By the 1940 edition, Woodworth implied that experiments of this type reveal causes, but other methods of inquiry do not. Woodworth's view of experiment and cause and his use of the terms independent and dependent variables appear to be the prototype for later textbooks. The context and implications of these changes are briefly discussed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Cause and Experiment in Introductory Psychology: An Analysis of R.S. Woodworth's Textbooks

Winston

1988

Teaching of Psychology

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“…Some say no, others say yes. Proponents of the non-teleological-rain interpretation include Ross (1936), Charlton (1970, 120-123), Nussbaum (1978, Balme (1987), Gotthelf (1987), Irwin (1988, 102-107), and Judson (2005. Proponents of the teleological-rain interpretation include Cooper (1982), Furley (1985, 179-181), Sedley (1991;, Wardy (1993), Code (1997), Scharle (2008), and Leunissen (2010).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

If naturalism is true, then scientific explanation is impossible

Bogardus

2022

Rel. Stud.

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I begin by retracing an argument from Aristotle for final causes in science. Then, I advance this ancient thought, and defend an argument for a stronger conclusion: that no scientific explanation can succeed, if Naturalism is true. The argument goes like this: (1) Any scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity. Next, I argue that (2) any explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves no element that calls out for explanation but lacks one. From (1) and (2) it follows that (3) a scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity, and this regularity does not call out for explanation while lacking one. I then argue that (4) if Naturalism is true, then all every natural regularity calls out for explanation but lacks one. From (3) and (4) it follows that (5) if Naturalism is true, then no scientific explanation can be successful. If you believe that scientific explanation can be (indeed, often has been) successful, as I do, then this is a reason to reject Naturalism.

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“…II 8 Aristotle proposes four arguments in favour of natural finality, as Philoponus too believes in the first theôria that he devotes to this chapter. Other interpreters disagree with this view, as well as with one another: Carteron (1926) distinguishes five arguments against mechanism in 198b34-199a32 and three arguments founded on mechanicism in 199a 33-b33; Charlton (1970) maintains that after setting out the opinion contrary to his, Aristotle proposes two or three arguments; Pellegrin (2000), thinks that Aristotle opposes eight arguments and two objections to the argument in favour of mechanism; Thomas Aquinas, De physico auditu sive Physicorum Aristotelis, Lib. II, Lectio XIII 497, thinks that Aristotle formulates five arguments in which he expresses his own views and then adds to these three other arguments presenting the perspective of mechanist philosophers.…”

Section: Aristotle and The Refutation Of Empedocles' Arguments In Favmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empedocles and the Other Physiologists in Aristotle’s Physics II 8

Giardina¹

2016

peitho

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Empedocles and the Other Physiologists in Aristotle's Physics II 8 GIOVANNA R. GIARDINA / Catania / Empedocles's theory of generation as model for the mechanistic argument inAristotle's Phys. II 8At the beginning of Phys. II 8 Aristotle announces the subject of the last two chapters of the second book as follows:We must explain then first why nature belongs to the class of causes which act for the sake of something; and then about the necessary and its place in nature, for all writers ascribe things to this cause, arguing that since the hot and the cold and the like are of such and such a kind, therefore certain things necessarily are and come to be -and if they mention any other cause (one friendship and strife, another mind), it is only to touch on it, and then good-bye to it.1 1 All translations of the Physics, unless otherwise noted, are by Hardie and Gaye in Barnes (1991).14 Giovanna R. Giardina / Catania / In this passage, after distinguishing nature as final cause from necessity, Aristotle explains that all philosophers consider necessity a cause by taking as examples the hot and cold and other things of a similar sort. The example makes it quite clear that Aristotle is referring to the material causes of which physiologists speak. Soon afterwards he notes that, although some philosophers have "touched upon" (ἁψάμενοι) another cause -for Love and Strife on the one hand and the Intellect, on the other, are moving causes for Aristotle -they immediately discarded them. This means that the philosophers in question believed that the material cause was sufficient to explain the fact that natural beings come about of necessity. In this regard, for example, Simplius argues that physiologists lead back beings to matter inasmuch as this coincides with necessity by stating precisely: ἀνάγουσι δὲ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ὡς ταύτην οὖσαν τὴν ἀνάγκην [...].From this passage of Aristotle it is also clear that the philosopher is thinking of Empedocles -to whom he implicitly refers when speaking of hot and cold 2 and Love and Strifeand Anaxagoras, whose notion of Intellect he mentions. This passage seems to have its counterpart in Metaph. I 7, 988a25 ff., where Aristotle mentions philosophers who took matter as the primary cause and explicitly refers to Anaxagoras and Empedocles. The two philosophers are once again mentioned together, 3 in relation both to their material causes and to the fact that they also "touched upon" (ἥψαντο) the moving cause. According to Philoponus, in Phys. 312,10 ff., Aristotle stated that some philosophers just "touched upon" the moving cause without believing that Love and Strife or Intellect are responsible for the generation of particular beings, in order to make it clear that these philosophers only posited a material cause: Anaxagoras posited the homeomeries and Empedocles hot and cold. Philoponus further adds that Plato had already raised this objection against his predecessors, since in Phd. 97b ff. he shows that Anaxagoras did not actually resort to Intellect, but simply explained the phenomen...

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Aristotle's Physics I, II

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Cause and Experiment in Introductory Psychology: An Analysis of R.S. Woodworth's Textbooks

Cause and Experiment in Introductory Psychology: An Analysis of R.S. Woodworth's Textbooks

If naturalism is true, then scientific explanation is impossible

Empedocles and the Other Physiologists in Aristotle’s Physics II 8

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