How to Include the Severely Disabled in a Contractarian Theory of Justice*

Abstract

A SUFFICIENTLY nuanced theory of distributive justice should be able to accomplish the following two theoretical tasks: it should provide grounds for meeting the needs of people who are not able to contribute to the production of the goods necessary to sustain them; and it should provide grounds for adequately compensating those who do contribute to the production of such goods. The first task suggests a basis for distribution that is independent of contribution; it rests perhaps on a moral ideal requiring that the basic needs of all individuals be met. The second task suggests a basis for distribution that is in some way connected to contribution. It rests, perhaps, upon an ideal of reciprocity according to which one is owed a share of the social goods she helps create, all things being equal.The theory of John Rawls-now the standard-bearer for accounts of justicecontains an idealizing assumption that was largely, though not completely, overlooked until underscored in a recent book by Eva Kittay. 1 This assumptionwhich I will call "the fully cooperating assumption"-states that all citizens will be regarded, for the purposes of Rawls's theory, as physically and mentally competent and hence able to participate fully in schemes of cooperation. 2 Rawls's

Liberalism, contractarianism, and the problem of exclusion

“…48 But non-cooperators have interests and needs that merit moral consideration, and so parties may offer support through a social minimum they establish when deciding more concrete constitutional matters at stages of agreement later than the original position. Maintaining the difference between entitlements of cooperators and non-cooperators seems legitimate when selecting principles of distribution, as occurs in the original position.…”

Duties of Justice to Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities

“…In offering this argument, I part company with many who defend the view that any Rawlsian theory of justice must treat citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities differently from other citizens (see Kittay 1999;Brighouse 2001;Nussbaum 2006;Richardson 2006;Stark 2007;Hartley 2009). Although I will not address the nuances of each theorist's position, I will focus on two key points used to justify the exclusion of people labeled with cognitive disabilities.…”

Respecting Human Dignity: Contract Versus Capabilities

“…I have offered a suggestion along these lines inStark 2007. See also, Cohen 2007.RESPECTING HUMAN DIGNITY…”