Duties of Justice to Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities

Feminist Approaches to Cognitive Disability

“…Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis explore the ways that individuals with cognitive disabilities might define and pursue particular conceptions of the good and consider what conditions are necessary to realize these aims (Francis and Silvers, ). In cases of individuals with severe or profound cognitive disabilities who may be non‐verbal, this may involve articulating particular enabling conditions required for them to flourish (Wong ) and addressing the nature and practical implications of guardianship and trusteeship (Kittay, , , , . )…”

“…It is important to engage with these movements and voices in order to assess the extent to which feminist philosophy, itself, is exclusionary, and to consider what is needed to include and value these voices and perspectives. This can be especially challenging when individuals cannot communicate verbally, yet new possibilities can emerge as alternate means of communication, perhaps even through artistic expression, are sought (Wong ; Carlson ; Vorhaus, ).…”

“…See the essays in Kittay and Carlson, 2010; Kittay, , , ; Carlson, , 2009, , , ; Silvers, , Wong, , ; Back, ; O'Donnovan, ; Vorhaus, . Note that not all of this work approaches cognitive disability from a feminist perspective.…”

Who's the Expert? Rethinking authority in the face of intellectual disability

“…Moreover, there has been a shift in the approach to ID in philosophical circles that reflects the rise of disability studies, an explicit acknowledgement of disability rights, and the need to critique traditional philosophical assumptions and methods that have been used to define and address ID (Kittay 1998; Silvers et al. 1998; MacIntyre 1999; Wong 2002, 2009; Nussbaum 2006; Kittay & Carlson 2009, 2010). In particular, a number of philosophers who have direct relationships with persons who have IDs have begun to theorise ‘from the margins’, and to speak from a place of proximity and first‐hand experience, thereby at once closing the gap between theory and practice and challenging its validity (Kittay 1998, 2005, 2009; Byrne 2000; Gottlieb 2002; Wong 2002).…”

“… 6 For a similar critique of the limits of philosophical theories and a wonderful discussion of what it means to recognise and enable the development of moral personhood in persons with very severe disabilities in the context of this concern, see Wong (2009, pp. 382–401). …”