2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.09.001
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How reasoning, judgment, and decision making are colored by gist-based intuition: A fuzzy-trace theory approach.

Abstract: Fuzzy-trace theory distinguishes verbatim (literal, exact) from gist (meaningful) representations, predicting that reliance on gist increases with experience and expertise. Thus, many judgment-and-decision-making biases increase with development, such that cognition is colored by context in ways that violate logical coherence and probability theories. Nevertheless, this increase in gist-based intuition is adaptive: Gist is stable, less sensitive to interference, and easier to manipulate. Moreover, gist capture… Show more

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Cited by 72 publications
(72 citation statements)
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“…Respondents may not have distinguished much among the “10 times more,” “100 times more,” or “chemicals present only in cigarettes” scenarios because individuals often have difficulty interpreting information about magnitude (Hammitt and Graham, 1999; Neil et al, 1994) or felt that 10 times was sufficient, or “good enough,” to be interested in dual use and the increases beyond that (100 times or chemicals completely absent in e-cigarettes) were not necessary. Alternatively, as predicted by fuzzy trace theory, some respondents in the “10 times more” and “100 times more” scenarios may have thought of this information as simply “more” rather than noticing the exact amount (Corbin et al, 2015). …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Respondents may not have distinguished much among the “10 times more,” “100 times more,” or “chemicals present only in cigarettes” scenarios because individuals often have difficulty interpreting information about magnitude (Hammitt and Graham, 1999; Neil et al, 1994) or felt that 10 times was sufficient, or “good enough,” to be interested in dual use and the increases beyond that (100 times or chemicals completely absent in e-cigarettes) were not necessary. Alternatively, as predicted by fuzzy trace theory, some respondents in the “10 times more” and “100 times more” scenarios may have thought of this information as simply “more” rather than noticing the exact amount (Corbin et al, 2015). …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Early theories proposed that expert knowledge is more critical for cue selection (i.e., what information should be looked for) than for cue weighting (i.e., how should the information be interpreted; Dawes, ; Einhorn, ). Advanced performers, ranging from chess grandmasters to cardiologists and intelligence analysts, have been found to be particularly good at extracting a meaningful gist from larger sets of data (Corbin, Reyna, Weldon, & Brainerd, ; De Groot, ; Reyna & Lloyd, ). In other words, their experience directs their attention to critical information.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The task calibration principle posits that despite the baseline preference for simple gist on reasoning problems, the demands of the response format and the specificity of the cues that are provided in the problem information influence that preference (Corbin, Weldon, Reyna, & Brainerd, 2015). The general rule is that reliance on gist shrinks as response formats and problem cues become increasingly numerical and differentiated (Wolfe & Reyna, 2010).…”
Section: Overview Of the Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%