People who threaten to cause harm may actualize their threat or bluff. To manage the risk that harmful acts will be perpetrated, it is of great importance to recognize differences between threatening behavior that will and will not be actualized. In this paper we present what is, to our knowledge, the first study in which verbal threats are examined experimentally. We theorize that threats reflecting actual intentions come with implementation details (how one will actualize the threat), whereas bluffs linger in the formation of ideas (reasons why one poses a threat). In a mock-paradigm, participants (N = 181) were instructed to threaten a company over the phone and were questioned about their threat during the call. Participants were either instructed not to actualize the threat (bluffers), to actualize it only if the company would not meet their demands (conditional actualizers) or to always actualize the threat (decisive actualizers). It was found that bluffers and actualizers differed in the amount of 'how' details they provided. In contrast to our prediction, bluffers provided comparatively more details on implementation. Possible explanations for this result are discussed.

Interviewing to assess the risk for violence has received little attention in the literature on threats. Threat managers-who aim to identify potential danger-typically collect information from sources around persons who pose a threat rather than questioning the threateners themselves. To elicit valuable information from threateners, it is important to understand the strategies they use to withstand the interview (i.e., counter-interview strategies). In the experiment, participants (N = 179) communicated a threat that they intended to actualize (actualizers) or not (bluffers), and were subsequently questioned about the threat using an interview protocol intended to communicate high or low suspicion. The findings showed that threatening required self-regulation. Participants were forthcoming, yet strategic and adaptive to the targets' response. Actualizers provided fewer details on how to implement the threat than did bluffers, and, when subjected to specific questions, bluffers provided more information overall than did actualizers. Knowledge on counter-interview strategies of threateners may contribute to the development of interview protocols that can be used to assess the risk for violence.Keywords: threat assessment, counter-interview strategy, investigative interviewing, true and false intent.

When faced with threats of violence, it is of great importance to assess the risk for actual harm to occur. Over the last decades, this task has developed into a domain of its own and professionals have specialised in threat assessment. However, it is yet unknown whether professional experience affects the quality of threat assessments. The present study examined how threat assessment professionals (N = 44), university students (N = 44), and laypersons (N = 45) assessed the risk for violence in three fictitious cases. The assessments (i.e., assigning risk values to different pieces of information) were found to be strikingly similar across the three groups.Yet, professionals agreed more with one another on their assessments, and professionals identified more relevant (empirically supported) threat cues when given the opportunity to request additional information. These results suggest that threat assessment professionals know better than nonprofessionals what information to look for, and hence, they may contribute most in the process of gathering information to clarify the threat. Such knowledge can help to optimise the use of expertise, which may improve the quality of threat assessments. The current findings can be of value to those who consult threat assessment professionals, as well as to the professionals themselves.

There is consensus about the importance to engage with, and if possible interview, individuals who threaten to cause harm. However, there exist little research on how to conduct such interviews. This paper contributes with an experimental approach on threat management interviewing. We explored what types of counter-interview strategies threateners employ, and we tested the efficacy of two common interview styles (direct interviewing vs. rapport-based interviewing). Participants (N = 120) were interviewed about a non-violent threat they had made (to press charges against their former employer) and reported what strategies they had used during the interview. No differences were found between the interview protocols for threat management outcomes (i.e., information gain, use of counter-interview strategies, and willingness to discuss or enact the threat). However, the study showed how threateners struck a deliberate balance between proving their stand and disguising implementation details. Critically, individuals with more serious intentions to enact the threat were more inclined to hide information from the interviewer. We argue that it is vital for threat management interviewers to i) understand what behaviors can be expected from the interviewee, and ii) learn about interview methods that can steer these behaviors towards information gain (which is beneficial to threat assessment) and towards de-escalation (which is the purpose of threat management). Public Significance Statement:This experimental study suggests that people who make or pose a threat behave semi-cooperative in threat assessment interviews: They provide information to explain or proof their case, but they conceal information on how they may implement the threat.The interview style (direct questioning vs. rapport-based questioning) had no effect on the amount of information they provided or on the number of counter-interview strategies they used.