In two experiments, criminal investigators (N = 50)

The mechanisms behind the 'emotional victim effect' (i.e., that the emotionality of a rape victim's demeanor affects perceived credibility) are relatively unexplored. In this article, a previously neglected mechanism--observers' affective response to the victim--is proposed as an alternative to the traditional expectancy-violation account. The emotional victim effect was replicated in an experiment with a sample of police trainees (N = 189), and cognitive load was found to increase the magnitude of the effect. Importantly, both compassionate affective response and expectancy violation actively mediated the emotional victim effect when the other mechanism was controlled for. These findings extend previous research on credibility judgments by introducing a 'hot' cognitive component in the judgment process. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Over the last ten years, Oosterhof and Todorov's valence-dominance model has emerged as the most prominent account of how people evaluate faces on social dimensions. In this model, two dimensions (valence and dominance) underpin social judgments of faces. Because this model has primarily been developed and tested in Western regions, it is unclear whether these findings apply to other regions. We addressed this question by replicating Oosterhof and Todorov's methodology across 11 world regions, 41 countries, and 11,570 participants. When we used Oosterhof and Todorov's original analysis strategy, the valence-dominance model generalized across regions. When we used an alternative methodology to allow for correlated dimensions we observed much less generalization. Collectively, these results suggest that, while the valence-dominance model generalizes very well across regions when dimensions are forced to be orthogonal, regional differences are revealed when we use different extraction methods, correlate and rotate the dimension reduction solution.

This study examined investigators' perceptions of the reliability of incriminating and exonerating evidence of different types. Police trainees in the role of investigators read the background of a homicide case and then received a piece of evidence that either confirmed or disconfirmed their prior suspicion against the suspect. Despite identical objective characteristics of the evidence, participants rated the disconfirming (vs. confirming) evidence as less reliable and generated more arguments to question its reliability. This asymmetrical scepticism was stronger for participants judging witness evidence, compared to DNA and photo evidence, supporting the hypothesis that different types of evidence vary in 'elasticity'-the extent to which subjective interpretations can be justified. Interestingly, the observed effects were not limited to the specific evidence in the case, but also affected the ratings of the type of evidence in general, suggesting that reliability criteria for witness information are highly malleable and sensitive to contextual influences.

An experiment was conducted where experienced criminal investigators (N = 49) evaluated the testimony of a witness who either confirmed or disconfirmed the focal hypothesis in a homicide case. Participants' motivation to perpetuate the hypothesis was manipulated by varying the need for cognitive closure via time pressure. The hypothesis-inconsistent witness was perceived as less reliable and credible, although its background and witnessing conditions were identical to those of the hypothesisconsistent witness. While this asymmetrical skepticism was not moderated by time pressure, participants under high (vs. low) time pressure were less inclined to adjust their confidence in the hypothesis in line with the witness testimony. Discussion focuses on implications for criminal investigations and theoretical contributions to investigative psychology.