How can public participation improve environmental governance in China? A policy simulation approach with multi-player evolutionary game

Chu, Zhaopeng; Bian, Chen; Yang, Jun

doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2022.106782

Cited by 86 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…The result that government green development behavior significantly and positively influences public participation is consistent with the findings of scholars such as Chen et al [ 29 ] and Chu et al [ 70 ]. Environmental governance cannot be achieved without the efforts of stakeholders.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 89%

What Is the Mechanism of Government Green Development Behavior Considering Multi-Agent Interaction? A Meta-Analysis

Dai

Zhu

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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Worsening environmental problems have created more and more challenges for green development, and the government is often seen as an important guide in turning this situation around. A government generally enacts green development through green development behavior, but previous research has not revealed the mechanism of this behavior. In addition, the multi-agent interaction between the government and green development behavior also needs to be explored. Based on an integrated theoretical model, the authors of this study adopted a meta-analysis method to analyze 18 high-quality published pieces from 6 mainstream databases and described the mechanism of government green development behavior in exploring and thinking about multi-agent interactions. In addition, the authors of this study explored differences in the roles of central and local government green development behaviors and the moderating role of regional heterogeneity. The research results showed that: (1) Enterprise economic behavior, enterprise environmental behavior, enterprise social behavior, and public participation are all significantly positively affected by government green development behavior; (2) local government green development actions have stronger effects than central government actions; (3) regional heterogeneity moderates the effect of government green development behavior. Furthermore, the authors of this study propose relevant countermeasures and suggestions from the government’s point of view. This research provides a theoretical and practical reference for governments to better improve their environmental systems and environmental supervision.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 89%

What Is the Mechanism of Government Green Development Behavior Considering Multi-Agent Interaction? A Meta-Analysis

Dai

Zhu

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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“…Policy simulations are virtual imitations of the effects of implementing policy instruments in the real world. Since they are future-oriented, their results cannot be verified by traditional out-of-sample fittings [ 51 ]. Nevertheless, research on government policies has been found to support the claims in this paper [ 43 , 52 , 53 , 54 ].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Reduce Food Waste Caused by Normative Illusion? A Study Based on Evolutionary Game Model Analysis

Tian

Zheng

2022

Foods

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Reducing food waste is a priority for all sectors of society as it threatens national food security and the sustainability of global agriculture. Many studies on food waste have focused on a single subject, and the psychological factors of consumer waste are often overlooked. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces consumers’ normative illusion, constructs an evolutionary game model in which the government, caterers and consumers collaborate to reduce food waste, and simulates and analyses the behavioural strategies of the three stakeholders. The results show that: Firstly, food waste can be reduced under certain conditions by incentive-guided and punishment-inhibited policies. Moreover, incentive-guided policies can reduce government expenditures more than punishment-inhibited ones. Secondly, implementation of prior intervention, the resultant intervention and reducing the probability of consumers’ aversion to the intervention of caterers can optimise the government’s punishment-inhibited policy. Finally, under the punishment-inhibited policy, caterers can bear 60% of the prior intervention costs for food waste management. When caterers invest 40–60% of the prior intervention costs, both caterers and consumers can achieve the ideal state of cooperation; caterers can accept 40% of the resultant intervention cost for food waste management, and when the resultant intervention cost is less than 40%, consumers choose not to waste. Both caterers and consumers are involved in reducing food waste when the probability of consumer dissatisfaction with a caterer’s intervention is reduced to less than 40%.

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“…However, the evolutionary game theory based on the assumption of bounded rationality can effectively solve the problem of stable decision making. The evolutionary game is from the perspective of biological evolution theory [ 56 ], through continuous learning and evolution among individuals [ 57 ], and finally reaches a stable state and forms an evolutionarily stable strategy [ 58 , 59 , 60 ]. Therefore, based on the multi-agent evolution mechanism of carbon trading, this paper sets up the enterprise–government two-party evolutionary game model and the enterprise–enterprise–government three-party evolutionary game model to explore the multi-agent game equilibrium of carbon trading behavior [ 61 ].…”

Section: Construction and Analysis Of Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Chen

Liu

2022

IJERPH

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As one of the most efficient means of emission reduction policies, carbon quota trading has a far-reaching impact on the carbon emission reduction of enterprises. Firstly, a two-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and government and a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise–enterprise–government are constructed based on the multi-agent driving mechanism, evolutionary game theory, scenario simulation, and other methods. Then, we conduct a series of policy simulations for carbon emission under different scenario models and various enforcement strengths. Lastly, the behavioral strategies and system evolution trajectories in enterprises and government carbon trading are comprehensively investigated. The results show that in the two-party and three-party evolutionary game models, the carbon trading behavior is affected by the joint action of the enterprise and the government. The difference in initial willingness mainly affects the speed of the subject’s convergence to the steady state. Based on this, policy suggestions are proposed, such as reducing the cost of carbon emission of enterprises, enhancing the vitality of carbon emission reduction of enterprises, and stimulating the power of government regulation and responsibility performance, which can provide suggestions for the development of the carbon market.

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How can public participation improve environmental governance in China? A policy simulation approach with multi-player evolutionary game

Cited by 86 publications

References 49 publications

What Is the Mechanism of Government Green Development Behavior Considering Multi-Agent Interaction? A Meta-Analysis

What Is the Mechanism of Government Green Development Behavior Considering Multi-Agent Interaction? A Meta-Analysis

How to Reduce Food Waste Caused by Normative Illusion? A Study Based on Evolutionary Game Model Analysis

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

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