Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Abstract

As one of the most efficient means of emission reduction policies, carbon quota trading has a far-reaching impact on the carbon emission reduction of enterprises. Firstly, a two-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and government and a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise–enterprise–government are constructed based on the multi-agent driving mechanism, evolutionary game theory, scenario simulation, and other methods. Then, we conduct a series of policy simulations for carbon emission under different scenario models and various enforcement strengths. Lastly, the behavioral strategies and system evolution trajectories in enterprises and government carbon trading are comprehensively investigated. The results show that in the two-party and three-party evolutionary game models, the carbon trading behavior is affected by the joint action of the enterprise and the government. The difference in initial willingness mainly affects the speed of the subject’s convergence to the steady state. Based on this, policy suggestions are proposed, such as reducing the cost of carbon emission of enterprises, enhancing the vitality of carbon emission reduction of enterprises, and stimulating the power of government regulation and responsibility performance, which can provide suggestions for the development of the carbon market.

Research on the Performance Management of Carbon Reduction by Local Governments from a Game Perspective—The Case of the Zhejiang Power Restriction Incident

“…First, previous work has studied the game between governments and carbon enforcers, which exists both within international organizations [36] and within countries [37]. At the national level, carbon-trading behavior is affected by the joint action of enterprises and governments [37].…”

Evolutionary game between government and shipping enterprises based on shipping cycle and carbon quota

“…Some scholars have used government-enterprise and enterpriseenterprise-government as game subjects respectively. They constructed evolutionary game models based on multi-intelligence drive mechanism, evolutionary game theory and scenario simulation to prove that carbon trading behavior is influenced by the joint role of enterprises and government (Yu et al, 2022). Zhao and Zhang used the government-generator as the evolving game subject.…”

“…In the existing literature, the benefits of the government mainly involve the human, material and financial costs of government regulation, the incentives and penalties of the government to enterprises, the benefits of the government through regulation. The benefits of shipping enterprises mainly involve the costs of low carbon technology innovation investment, the initial allocation of carbon quotas, the costs of standardized operation of shipping enterprises, the costs of non-standardized operation and the carbon revenue coefficient (Zhao and Zhang, 2018;Zhang et al, 2019;Yu et al, 2022). The revenue of each party of the game is an important part of the model, and we will make assumptions about it.…”

Stability analysis of evolutionary dynamics of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric games

“…For instance, discussion on policies to promote the development of a low-carbon economy, i.e. carbon emission trading [25][26][27] and carbon-sink fishery [28,29], supply chain problem analysis [30,31], environmental mass incidents [32], elderly care [33,34], etc. Besides, asymmetric evolutionary games have been also used to discuss the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas [35][36][37], and seeking the reasons for the existence of cooperation in dilemmas is a research hotspot in evolutionary game theory.…”