No abstract

This article constructs a duopoly market with product differentiation and analyses profits, consumer surplus and social welfare under three conditions: (a) two enterprises have sufficient capacity; (b) one enterprise has insufficient capacity, and another enterprise has excess capacity that is not shared; and (c) one enterprise has insufficient capacity, and another enterprise has excess capacity and engages in capacity sharing. Through comparison, the implementation conditions for and effects of capacity sharing and the role of product differentiation are revealed. The results show that capacity sharing helps increase producer surplus and social welfare. Capacity constraints reduce social welfare but can be solved by capacity sharing. Capacity sharing can only be realised when both enterprises are profitable, and the charge for capacity sharing should not be too high or too low. Product differentiation has impacts on output, profit, consumer surplus and social welfare, and these impacts are restricted by the existence of capacity constraints and capacity sharing. ARTICLE HISTORY

No abstract

The economic circle around Beijing is a very important area that supports the development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region in China. The economic growths of the economic circle around Beijing are deeply affected by the regional economic disparity. Besides the resources and environment problems, economic factors may be more prominent of regional sustainability. The objective of this paper is: (1) To find out what caused the regional economic disparity of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region; and (2) to assess the economic sustainable development status of the cities around Beijing, and give suggestions to narrow the regional disparity from the economic growth view. We used an assessment method based on the economic sustainable index system—the order relation method named G1 method, revised by standard deviation. The results showed that the fundamental reason for the differences lies in the disparity in production efficiency. The disparity in the regional economy increases the flow of talent to Beijing and Tianjin, so the labor productivity of Hebei Province will not improve. Thus, the economic gap among Hebei, Beijing, and Tianjin will continue to grow. This negative feedback will further exacerbate the economic growth problem. In terms of narrowing regional disparity, some implications are highlighted. Rational industrial structure, a high level of development in the manufacturing industry, and a high proportion of strategic emerging industries are important for the cities around Beijing to achieve high-level industry transfer, and the technological progress needed to promote economic growth.

In the institutional context of China’s political centralization and fiscal decentralization, this study explores the environmental regulations that make the central and local governments join efforts in air pollution control. Policy simulations in an evolutionary game show that the best approach is to internalize environmental costs and benefits in local governments’ objective function. The effectiveness of several policy instruments is examined individually and jointly, including administrative inspection, transfer payment, and environmental taxes. It is shown that in case environmental consequences are not internalized, appropriate application of policy instruments can incentivize goal-oriented local governments to choose the socially optimal strategy.

No abstract

No abstract

Political blue sky is unsustainable because conflicting interests in China's fragmented authoritarianism (FA) lead to the failure of air pollution regulations. This study explores how to transform China's political blue sky from short-term fabrication to long-term consolidation by effective environmental regulations. A two-pronged mechanism design in the non-cooperative tripartite evolutionary game is employed to model the dynamic cost-benefit strategy interactions among the central government, local governments, and polluting enterprises for sustainable air pollution control. Policy simulations are conducted to examine the effectiveness of several environmental regulation instruments for leading to the ideal outcome. In baseline scenarios, proper coordination of environmental inspection, vertical and horizontal transfers, and environmental taxation can impel the game to converge to the desired evolutionary equilibrium. In extended scenarios, three long-term oriented inspirations-double-dividend effect of environmental tax revenues, public monitoring, and the Porter hypothesis effect of environmental regulations-can improve the efficiency of environmental regulations compared to baseline scenarios. From a methodology perspective, policy simulation in an evolutionary game framework provides a novel addition to the research toolkit for addressing FA.