Horizontal cooperation and information sharing between suppliers in the manufacturer–supplier triad

Shi, Ning; Zhou, Shaorui; Wang, Fan; Xu, Sheng-Hao; Xiong, Shuping

doi:10.1080/00207543.2013.869630

Cited by 23 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…For each raw material of each product which manufacturer produces and wholesales to retailers, at least two suppliers are available. In other words, due to considering competition among suppliers, single sourcing is not permitted ( [33]). The relevant parameters and decision variables of supply chain participants are shown in Table 1, and Table 2, respectively.…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game theoretic approach to coordination of pricing, advertising, and inventory decisions in a competitive supply chain

Sadigh¹,

Chaharsooghi²,

Sheikhmohammady³

2015

JIMO

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Supply chain members coordinate with each other in order to obtain more profit. The major mechanisms for coordination among supply chain echelons are pricing, inventory management, and ordering decisions. Regarding to these mechanisms, supply chain participants have conflicts of interest. This paper concerns coordination of enterprise decisions including pricing, advertising, ordering, and inventory decisions in a multi-echelon supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers, one manufacturer, and multiple retailers. In the current study, a novel inventory model is presented for both the manufacturer, and the retailers who are able to determine the number of orders for each product. Moreover, each supply chain member has equal power and make their decisions simultaneously. The proposed model considers the relationships among three echelon supply chain members based on a non-cooperative Nash game with pricing and inventory decisions. An iterative solution algorithm is proposed to find Nash equilibrium point of the game. Several numerical examples are presented to study the application of the model as well as the effectiveness of the algorithm. Finally, a comprehensive sensitivity analysis is performed and some important managerial insights are highlighted.2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 91A10, 90B60, 90B05.

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Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game theoretic approach to coordination of pricing, advertising, and inventory decisions in a competitive supply chain

Sadigh¹,

Chaharsooghi²,

Sheikhmohammady³

2015

JIMO

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Wu et al (2011) analyse quality information sharing in a system consisting of one buyer and two suppliers with quality uncertainty; they verify that information sharing benefits the buyer and the suppliers. Shi et al (2014) consider a system with one manufacturer and two suppliers. One is a strategic supplier with long lead time and high quality, while the other is an urgent supplier with short lead time and low quality.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

Gao

Cheng

Shen

et al. 2016

International Journal of Production Research

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In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer's fault as the supplier's, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture's fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture's fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer's fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier's penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.

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“…These classic papers find that the equilibrium outcome involves no sharing of sales demand information but price information is disclosed. Shi et al (2013) study horizontal information sharing between two suppliers (one is considered a strategic supplier and the other, a backup supplier) who provide components for a manufacturer. They find sharing information or cooperation between two suppliers is beneficial for the suppliers but not the manufacturer.…”

Section: Information Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers

Ming

Liu

Deng

et al. 2014

International Journal of Production Research

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In this paper, under a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers, we investigate vertical and horizontal information sharing in different channel structures and the manufacturer's choice on whether or not to keep a direct channel. To this end, we first study the dual-channel structure where uncertain demand is a linear function of price with a generalised-distribution base demand and show that the retailers have incentives to share information horizontally but not vertically, while the manufacturer is better off with vertical information sharing but its expected profit is not affected by horizontal information sharing. We next examine the retail-channel structure and find the basic results remain unchanged. Finally, we provide closed-form internal and external conditions under which the manufacturer can benefit from owning a dual-channel structure. Our study extends the existing literature by combining information sharing and dual-channel choice, introducing channel difference, discussing the impact of channel structure on horizontal and vertical sharing as well as providing interesting managerial insights for channel choice.

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Horizontal cooperation and information sharing between suppliers in the manufacturer–supplier triad

Cited by 23 publications

References 27 publications

A game theoretic approach to coordination of pricing, advertising, and inventory decisions in a competitive supply chain

A game theoretic approach to coordination of pricing, advertising, and inventory decisions in a competitive supply chain

Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers

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