A game theoretic approach to coordination of pricing, advertising, and inventory decisions in a competitive supply chain

Sadigh, Ali Naimi; Chaharsooghi, S. Kamal; Sheikhmohammady, Majid

doi:10.3934/jimo.2016.12.337

Cited by 33 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(61 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The model is aimed to find optimum price, discount rate and replenishment cycle. Naimi Sadigh et al [15] also developed a model of pricing, order quantity and marketing in a three level supply chain with several suppliers, one manufacturer and several retailers which is solved by Nash equilibrium. The competitive model between two supply chains consisting of a manufacturer and retailer with replaceable goods for a real problem in a food industry was developed by Aminnaseri and Azari Khojasteh [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of Pricing and Order Quantity for Two Replaceable and Seasonal Products

Rasouli

Amin-Naseri

Kamalabadi

et al. 2020

IJE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper deals with the coordination of pricing and order quantity decisions for two seasonal and substitutable goods in one firm. We assume that the customers are price sensitive and they are willing to buy the cheaper products, which is known as one way and customers-based price driven substitution. First, a mathematical model is developed for one firm, which contains two replaceable products considering seasonality. The model aims to maximize the profit by determining optimal dynamic prices, order quantities and the number of periods for both of the products. Then, we show that the objective function is strictly concave of price and has a unique maximum solution. Next, an exact algorithm based on the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions is presented to determine the optimal decisions. Finally, a numerical example accompanied by sensitivity analysis on key parameters is developed to illustrate the efficiency of solution procedure and the algorithm.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of Pricing and Order Quantity for Two Replaceable and Seasonal Products

Rasouli

Amin-Naseri

Kamalabadi

et al. 2020

IJE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Their later work in 2012 claims the optimality of the quasi base-stock list-price target-promotion policy described by the existence of a critical inventory level, a list price and a target promotion. Sadigh et al (2016) analyzed the problem in a multi-echelon supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers, one manufacturer, and multiple retailers, using an iterative algorithm to find Nash Equilibrium point of the game. Chen (2015) used Stackelberg game theoretic framework in a two-echelon supply chain setting and gave an insight that the retailer and the manufacturer can affect the market size by investing in local advertising and making marketing expenditures on national brand names, but with diminishing returns.…”

Section: Introduction and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Optimal Model at the Interface of Operations with Social Media Marketing

Teyarachakul

2018

OSCM: An Int. Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Social media sales and the logistics of products is being shuttled into a new technological paradigm. The purpose of this paper is to review the role of social media sales force and its effects on lot size process and the pricing under an infinite-time horizon assumption. We begin with reviewing the role and importance of social media in business; with a focus on the mathematic deterministic model for decision making that offer ways in which social media influences each step. Scenarios are specifically considered. In the first scenario, price is determined by the market. What size to hold inventoried products and what to budget for promotions on a social media platform are the important variables in market determined pricing. In the second scenario, price is examined by the decision maker based on maximizing the profit margin. In this first case scenario, advertising and product prices are jointly considered to maximize the profit margin. In this second case scenario, lot sizing is considered to minimize costs of holding inventories and placing orders. In both scenarios, the profit function outcome is concave. Therefore, the model optimizes solutions for pricing, lot-sizing for social media advertising policies.

show abstract

“…The retailers competed in quantity form an oligopoly over the end market. Sadigh et al (2016) [15] studied the coordination of pricing decisions in a three-echelon single channel supply chain including multiple retailers, one manufacturer, and multiple suppliers. The retailers determine their strategies simultaneously.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition in a dual-channel supply chain considering duopolistic retailers with different behaviours

Sun¹,

Wan²,

Liu³

et al. 2021

Journal of Industrial &Amp; Management Optimization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study competition in a dual-channel supply chain in which a single supplier sells a single product through its own direct channel and through two different duopolistic retailers. The two retailers have three competitive behaviour patterns: Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg. Three models are respectively constructed for these patterns, and the optimal decisions for the three patterns are obtained. These optimal solutions are compared, and the effects of certain parameters on the optimal solutions are examined for the three patterns by considering two scenarios: a special case and a general case. In the special case, the equilibrium supply chain structures are analysed, and the optimal quantity and profit are compared for the three different competitive behaviours. Furthermore, both parametric and numerical analyses are presented, and some managerial insights are obtained. We find that in the special case, the Stackelberg game allows the supplier to earn the highest profit, the retailer playing the Collusion game makes the supplier earn the lowest profit, and the Stackelberg leader can gain a first-mover advantage as to the follower. In the general case, the supplier can achieve a higher profit by raising the maximum retail price or holding down the self-price sensitivity factor.

show abstract

A game theoretic approach to coordination of pricing, advertising, and inventory decisions in a competitive supply chain

Cited by 33 publications

References 42 publications

Coordination of Pricing and Order Quantity for Two Replaceable and Seasonal Products

Coordination of Pricing and Order Quantity for Two Replaceable and Seasonal Products

An Optimal Model at the Interface of Operations with Social Media Marketing

Competition in a dual-channel supply chain considering duopolistic retailers with different behaviours

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About