Hedonism and the Experience Machine

Barber, Alex W.

doi:10.1080/05568641.2011.591850

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Alex Barber argues at length that 'the argument Nozick generates from his example is riddled with difficulties'. 11 Although this leaves open the possibility that the experience machine might be the basis for a different, more effective argument against hedonism, Barber doesn't mention this possibility. Instead, he gives a new argument against hedonism that 'takes its cue from Nozick's discussion' but is entirely unrelated to the experience machine.…”

Section: Matthew Silverstein Agreesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead, he gives a new argument against hedonism that 'takes its cue from Nozick's discussion' but is entirely unrelated to the experience machine. 12 One therefore gets the impression that he believes that the experience machine cannot be effectively employed to cast doubt on hedonism -an impression that is supported by his claim that '[his] quarrel has been with Nozick's example, not with what he tried to show with it'. 13 Finally, although Dan Weijers doesn't wholeheartedly endorse the view that the experience machine gives us no evidence against hedonism, he appears to be tempted by it.…”

Section: Matthew Silverstein Agreesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12 One therefore gets the impression that he believes that the experience machine cannot be effectively employed to cast doubt on hedonism -an impression that is supported by his claim that '[his] quarrel has been with Nozick's example, not with what he tried to show with it'. 13 Finally, although Dan Weijers doesn't wholeheartedly endorse the view that the experience machine gives us no evidence against hedonism, he appears to be tempted by it. For although he says that reflection on the experience machine 'produces some judgments that constitute evidence against hedonism', he claims on the very same page that 'contemplation of the experience machine should no longer give us prima facie reason for rejecting hedonism and other internalist mental state theories of well-being'.…”

Section: Matthew Silverstein Agreesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Tännsjö (2007), pp. 93-95.13 Barber (2011), p. 259.14 Barber (2011), pp. 271-72.15 Barber (2011), p. 276.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…93-95.13 Barber (2011), p. 259.14 Barber (2011), pp. 271-72.15 Barber (2011), p. 276. Italics added.16 Weijers (2014), p. 529.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The experience machine was traditionally thought to refute hedonism about welfare. In recent years, however, the tide has turned: many philosophers have argued not merely that the experience machine doesn't rule out hedonism, but that it doesn't count against it at all. I argue for a moderate position between those two extremes: although the experience machine doesn't decisively rule out hedonism, it provides us with some reason to reject it. I also argue for a particular way of using the experience machine to argue against hedonism – one that appeals directly to intuitions about the welfare values of experientially identical lives rather than to claims about what we value or claims about whether we would, or should, plug into the machine. The two issues are connected: the conviction that the experience machine leaves hedonism unscathed is partly due to neglect of the best way to use the experience machine.

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Section: Matthew Silverstein Agreesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Matthew Silverstein Agreesmentioning

confidence: 99%