An Assessment of Recent Responses to the Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism

Weijers, Dan; Schouten, Vanessa

doi:10.1007/s10790-013-9395-8

Cited by 29 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Others formulate nozick's objection differently. See, for example, Weijers and Schouten (2013) and Feldman (2011).…”

Section: The Experience Machinementioning

confidence: 99%

A New Defense of Hedonism about Well-Being

Bramble¹

2016

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The experience Machine, and The resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right motivation for it is the 'experience requirement' (i.e., that something can benefit or harm a being only if it affects the phenomenology of her experiences in some way). next, I argue that hedonists should accept a felt-quality theory of pleasure, rather than an attitude-based theory. Finally, I offer new responses to the three objections. Central to my responses are (i) a distinction between experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some pleasurable phenomenology) and being aware of that pleasure, and (ii) an emphasis on diversity in one's pleasures. 1. In this essay, I will use 'pain' to refer to unpleasurable experiences more generally. 2. These include Democritus, Aristippus, epicurus, Jeremy Bentham, and J. S. Mill. Others whose views seem at times to come close to hedonism include Socrates, Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, and Sidgwick. 3. notable exceptions include Feldman (2004), Crisp (2006), Heathwood (2006), and Bradley (2009). note that Heathwood counts as both a hedonist and a desire-based theorist of well-being due to his desire-based theory of pleasure.

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“…Others formulate nozick's objection differently. See, for example, Weijers and Schouten (2013) and Feldman (2011).…”

Section: The Experience Machinementioning

confidence: 99%

A New Defense of Hedonism about Well-Being

Bramble¹

2016

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…These can be, but are not restricted to, the kinds of insights that are pumped by philosophical (counter-) examples. For example, Nozick’s well-known experience-machine example—in which he purports that most people would not like to plug into a machine that generates great, but unreal experiences—illustrates the intuition that imaginative pleasurable experience is not enough for well-being (see Weijers and Schouten 2013). However, they may also involve more general beliefs about well-being that are often already taken as given—platitudes—such as the idea that being sick generally affects well-being negatively.…”

Section: Intuitions Principles and Theory-buildingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?

Deijl

2016

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

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The concept of well-being is increasingly gaining acceptance as an object of science, and many different types of well-being measures have been developed. A debate has emerged about which measures are able to capture well-being successfully. An important underlying problem is that there is no unified conceptual framework about the nature of well-being—a hotly debated topic of philosophical discussion. I argue that while there is little agreement about the nature of well-being in philosophy, there is an important agreement on some important principles relevant for its measurement. I argue that well-being science has good reasons to accommodate these principles, but currently fails to do so.

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“…2 While rough, this definition will suffice for present purposes. 3 See Sumner (1996) and Kagan (1992) 5 For an extensive list of authors who have 'stated or implied that the experience machine thought experiment is a knockdown refutation' of hedonism, see Weijers and Schouten (2013). 6 , p. 104.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For an extensive list of authors who have ‘stated or implied that the experience machine thought experiment is a knock‐down refutation’ of hedonism, see Weijers and Schouten ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%