Group formation through indirect reciprocity

Oishi, Koji; Shimada, Takashi; Ito, Nobuyasu

doi:10.1103/physreve.87.030801

Cited by 21 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…We then turn to (iii) stern judging, which-with indirect observation and public assessment errors-can maintain a goodness rate as high as that of simple standing. In stern judging, however, the indirect observation condition leads Discriminators to form two exclusive sub---groups that assess in---group members as good and out---group members as bad [60]. Our extra simulations confirm this and further reveal that the relative sizes of two exclusive sub---groups as such converge at around 50%.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 63%

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The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

Sasaki

Yamamoto

Okada

et al. 2017

Games

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Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted.Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks. We comparatively analyze four of the leading moral assessment rules-shunning, image scoring, stern judging, and simple standing-and base the model on the giving game in regular networks for Cooperators, Defectors, and Discriminators. Discriminators rely on a proper moral assessment rule. By using individual-based models, we show that the four assessment rules are differently characterized in terms of how cooperation evolves, depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio, the network-node degree, and the observation and error conditions. Our findings show that the most tolerant rule-simple standing-is the most robust among the four assessment rules in promoting cooperation in regular networks.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 63%

“…In the case of the rare ALLDs, an individual would be assessed as good with a probability of 50%. This leads to the conclusion that the rare ALLDs are better off than the resident Discriminators [60]. These analyses were conducted for the complete graph and could be applied to sufficiently large node degrees.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

Sasaki

Yamamoto

Okada

et al. 2017

Games

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“…It is found not only in human societies [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16] but also in biological systems [17]. Indirect reciprocity is also a boosting mechanism of group formation [18] and in-group favouritism [19][20][21], another aspect of human cooperation. This mechanism relies on the abilities of individuals to monitor the interactions of others, and to assess those interactions using moral sense even when they are not personally engaged in them [22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sasaki

2013

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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Stern-judging is one of the best-known assessment rules in indirect reciprocity.Indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.It relies on mutual monitoring and assessments, i.e., individuals judge, following their own assessment rules, whether other individuals are "good" or "bad" according to information on their past behaviors. Among many assessment rules, stern-judging is known to provide stable cooperation in a population, as observed when all members in the population know all about others' behaviors (public information case) and when the members never commit an assessment error. In this paper, the effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging is investigated. By analyzing the image matrix, which describes who is good in the eyes of whom in the population, we analytically show that private information and assessment error cause the collapse of stern-judging: all individuals assess other individuals as "good" at random with a probability of

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“…Inversely, some papers showed that indirect reciprocity affects population structures. For instance, it is reported that indirect reciprocity can function as a boosting mechanism of group formation and in-group favoritism, which is another aspect of cooperation [40][41][42][43].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theoretical Approach to Norm Ecosystems: Two Adaptive Architectures of Indirect Reciprocity Show Different Paths to the Evolution of Cooperation

Uchida¹,

Yamamoto

Okada

et al. 2018

Front. Phys.

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation, by which beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. This mechanism relies on the ability of individuals to know the past actions of others, and to assess those actions. There are many different systems of assessing others, which can be interpreted as rudimentary social norms (i.e., views on what is "good" or "bad"). In this paper, impacts of different adaptive architectures, i.e., ways for individuals to adapt to environments, on indirect reciprocity are investigated. We examine two representative architectures: one based on replicator dynamics and the other on genetic algorithm. Different from the replicator dynamics, the genetic algorithm requires describing the mixture of all possible norms in the norm space under consideration. Therefore, we also propose an analytic method to study norm ecosystems in which all possible second order social norms potentially exist and compete. The analysis reveals that the different adaptive architectures show different paths to the evolution of cooperation. Especially we find that so called Stern-Judging, one of the best studied norms in the literature, exhibits distinct behaviors in both architectures. On one hand, in the replicator dynamics, Stern-Judging remains alive and gets a majority steadily when the population reaches a cooperative state. On the other hand, in the genetic algorithm, it gets a majority only temporarily and becomes extinct in the end.

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Group formation through indirect reciprocity

Cited by 21 publications

References 20 publications

The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity

A Theoretical Approach to Norm Ecosystems: Two Adaptive Architectures of Indirect Reciprocity Show Different Paths to the Evolution of Cooperation

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