Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity

Uchida, S.; Sasaki, Tatsuya

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2013.08.006

Cited by 42 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…How such initial disagreements spread may itself depend on the social norm used by the population. While some norms can maintain cooperation even in the presence of rare disagreements, other norms are more susceptible to deviations from the public information assumption (34)(35)(36)(37). Here, we explore systematically how the leading-eight strategies fare when information is private, noisy, and incomplete.…”

Section: Table 1 the Leading-eight Strategies Of Indirect Reciprocitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information

Hilbe

Schmid

Tkadlec

et al. 2018

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

121

165

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Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other’s reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These “leading-eight” strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.

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Section: Table 1 the Leading-eight Strategies Of Indirect Reciprocitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information

Hilbe

Schmid

Tkadlec

et al. 2018

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

121

165

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Some of the original studies of indirect reciprocity via image scoring have explored the evolutionary dynamics with private information [38,39]. More recent studies have discussed topics of indirect reciprocity with private information, such as the effects of private information on assessment rules [40,41], incomplete observation [42], and assessment errors [43], among others. Importantly, the distribution of reputations in the population, which specifies how individuals perceive each other, can be evolving over time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information

Olejarz

Ghang

Nowak

2015

Games

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We consider indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information. A game is offered between two players and accepted unless it is known that the other person is a defector. Whenever a defector manages to exploit a cooperator, his or her reputation is revealed to others in the population with some probability. Therefore, people have different private information about the reputation of others, which is a setting that is difficult to analyze in the theory of indirect reciprocity. Since a defector loses a fraction of his social ties each time he exploits a cooperator, he is less efficient at exploiting cooperators in subsequent rounds. We analytically calculate the critical benefit-to-cost ratio above which cooperation is successful in various settings. We demonstrate quantitative agreement with simulation results of a corresponding Wright-Fisher process with optional interactions and private information. We also deduce a simple necessary condition for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio.

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“…From the players' viewpoint, although the same interaction can be interpreted differently by players with distinct norms, different individuals that share the same norm always have the same opinion since all individuals are based on the same information in the model. In the literature, the imperfectness of information has been studied in several ways [29,30,33,[44][45][46] and examining the effect of such imperfectness may lead us to understand the moral ecosystem more deeply. Obviously this present paper is just a first step to theoretically investigate the competition and cooperation among multiple norms.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From time to time, one potential donor and one potential recipient are chosen at random from the population and they engage in a donation game: the donor decides whether to help the recipient at a personal cost c. If the donor chooses to help, the recipient receives a benefit b > c; otherwise the recipient obtains nothing. Each individual in the population experiences such decision makings many times both as a donor and as a recipient [29][30][31]. From here on, we denote the action "help" by "1" and "refuse" by "0."…”

Section: Game Norm and Payoffmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Theoretical Approach to Norm Ecosystems: Two Adaptive Architectures of Indirect Reciprocity Show Different Paths to the Evolution of Cooperation

Uchida¹,

Yamamoto

Okada

et al. 2018

Front. Phys.

Self Cite

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation, by which beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. This mechanism relies on the ability of individuals to know the past actions of others, and to assess those actions. There are many different systems of assessing others, which can be interpreted as rudimentary social norms (i.e., views on what is "good" or "bad"). In this paper, impacts of different adaptive architectures, i.e., ways for individuals to adapt to environments, on indirect reciprocity are investigated. We examine two representative architectures: one based on replicator dynamics and the other on genetic algorithm. Different from the replicator dynamics, the genetic algorithm requires describing the mixture of all possible norms in the norm space under consideration. Therefore, we also propose an analytic method to study norm ecosystems in which all possible second order social norms potentially exist and compete. The analysis reveals that the different adaptive architectures show different paths to the evolution of cooperation. Especially we find that so called Stern-Judging, one of the best studied norms in the literature, exhibits distinct behaviors in both architectures. On one hand, in the replicator dynamics, Stern-Judging remains alive and gets a majority steadily when the population reaches a cooperative state. On the other hand, in the genetic algorithm, it gets a majority only temporarily and becomes extinct in the end.

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Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity

Cited by 42 publications

References 49 publications

Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information

Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information

Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information

A Theoretical Approach to Norm Ecosystems: Two Adaptive Architectures of Indirect Reciprocity Show Different Paths to the Evolution of Cooperation

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