Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information

Olejarz, Jason; Ghang, Whan; Nowak, Martin A.

doi:10.3390/g6040438

Cited by 25 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 51 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In other words, their history of moves is given as public information, whose accessibility is limited only by their memory spans. Moreover, we set aside other public information such as social standing, which is required in Contrite TFT [22,23,24,25] as well as in some form of indirect reciprocity [26,27,28,29,30,31,32]. After deriving our main results under these assumptions, we will revisit the problem of perception error.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Baek

Choi

2017

Journal of Theoretical Biology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent's last move. According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional cooperation.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Baek

Choi

2017

Journal of Theoretical Biology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In the case of the public information scheme, the image matrix reduces to a vector of dimension N . A private monitoring system is difficult to analyze, and only a few studies attempt it 28 , 32 , 44 – 47 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tolerant indirect reciprocity can boost social welfare through solidarity with unconditional cooperators in private monitoring

Okada

Sasaki

Nakai

2017

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Indirect reciprocity is an important mechanism for resolving social dilemmas. Previous studies explore several types of assessment rules that are evolutionarily stable for keeping cooperation regimes. However, little is known about the effects of private information on social systems. Most indirect reciprocity studies assume public monitoring in which individuals share a single assessment for each individual. Here, we consider a private monitoring system that loosens such an unnatural assumption. We explore the stable norms in the private system using an individual-based simulation. We have three main findings. First, narrow and unstable cooperation: cooperation in private monitoring becomes unstable and the restricted norms cannot maintain cooperative regimes while they can in public monitoring. Second, stable coexistence of discriminators and unconditional cooperators: under private monitoring, unconditional cooperation can play a role in keeping a high level of cooperation in tolerant norm situations. Finally, Pareto improvement: private monitoring can achieve a higher cooperation rate than does public monitoring.

show abstract

“…Cooperation and reputation have been mathematically linked in models of Indirect Reciprocity (IR)1112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142. IR models comprise individuals who adopt heuristics for decision-making based on reputations.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates

Santos

Pacheco

Santos

2016

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cooperation has been recognized as an evolutionary puzzle since Darwin, and remains identified as one of the biggest challenges of the XXIst century. Indirect Reciprocity (IR), a key mechanism that humans employ to cooperate with each other, establishes that individual behaviour depends on reputations, which in turn evolve depending on social norms that classify behaviours as good or bad. While it is well known that different social norms give rise to distinct cooperation levels, it remains unclear how the performance of each norm is influenced by the random exploration of new behaviours, often a key component of social dynamics where a plethora of stimuli may compel individuals to deviate from pre-defined behaviours. Here we study, for the first time, the impact of varying degrees of exploration rates – the likelihood of spontaneously adopting another strategy, akin to a mutation probability in evolutionary dynamics – in the emergence of cooperation under IR. We show that high exploration rates may either improve or harm cooperation, depending on the underlying social norm at work. Regarding some of the most popular social norms studied to date, we find that cooperation under Simple-standing and Image-score is enhanced by high exploration rates, whereas the opposite occurs for Stern-judging and Shunning.

show abstract

Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information

Cited by 25 publications

References 51 publications

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Tolerant indirect reciprocity can boost social welfare through solidarity with unconditional cooperators in private monitoring

Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About