The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

Sasaki, Tatsuya; Yamamoto, H.; Okada, Isamu; Uchida, S.

doi:10.3390/g8010008

Cited by 19 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…Importantly, crosstalk is different from previous approaches that combined direct and indirect (downstream) reciprocity. In models of downstream reciprocity, a player’s strategy depends on the co-player’s reputation, and hence on the co-players’ interactions with others 38 , 57 – 64 . A combination of direct reciprocity and downstream reciprocity can promote cooperation because a single defection in one game may lead several unaffected co-players to retaliate against the defector 27 – 29 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness

et al. 2018

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Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows us to analyze “crosstalk” between a player’s concurrent games. In the presence of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person’s decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness

et al. 2018

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“…Reputation is one of the most practical tools for measuring the partners' quality and incentivizing the partners' behaviors [52]. To the best of our knowledge, only one routing protocol so far has used reputation-based games.…”

Section: Games In Routing For Wmsnsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game theory-based Routing for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Comparative Survey

Habib

Moh

2019

Applied Sciences

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Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have become an important and promising technology owing to their wide range of applications in disaster response, battle field surveillance, wildfire monitoring, radioactivity monitoring, etc. In WSNs, routing plays a significant role in delivery latency, energy consumption, and packet delivery ratio. Furthermore, as these applications are used in critical operations with limited irreplaceable batteries, routing protocols are required to be flawless as well as energy efficient. The dynamic environment also requires intelligent and adaptive routing. Game theory is widely used for designing routing protocols in WSNs to achieve not only reduced energy consumption but also increased packet delivery ratio. The core features of efficiently designed game theory-based routing protocols include optimal cluster head selection in hierarchical routing, energy-efficient and delay-aware route discovery, fault-tolerant data delivery, and coalition forming and grouping among nodes for stringent data transfer. In this paper, different routing protocols based on various types of games are extensively reviewed, which have been reported so far for improving energy consumption, delay, route establishment time, packet delivery ratio, and network lifetime. The different game theory-based routing protocols are qualitatively compared with each other in terms of major features, advantages, limitations, and key characteristics. For each protocol, possible applications and future improvements are summarized. Certain important open concerns and challenges are also discussed, along with future research directions.

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“…A non-negligible fact is that, with some exceptions, 30 most theoretical works assume the well-mixed structure to study the reputation evaluation. Recently, Sasaki et al 38 investigated the evolution of reputation-based cooperation in a regular lattice considering four leading second-order assessment rules (these rules will be defined and discussed in Sec. II B).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation

Xia

Gracia-Lázaro

Moreno

2020

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science

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The understanding of cooperative behavior in social systems has been the subject of intense research over the past few decades. In this regard, the theoretical models used to explain cooperation in human societies have been complemented with a growing interest in experimental studies to validate the proposed mechanisms. In this work, we rely on previous experimental findings to build a theoretical model based on two cooperation driving mechanisms: second-order reputation and memory. Specifically, taking the donation game as a starting point, the agents are distributed among three strategies, namely, unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and discriminators, where the latter follow a second-order assessment rule: shunning, stern judging, image scoring, or simple standing. A discriminator will cooperate if the evaluation of the recipient's last actions contained in his memory is above a threshold of (in)tolerance. In addition to the dynamics inherent to the game, another imitation dynamics, involving much longer times (generations), is introduced. The model is approached through a meanfield approximation that predicts the macroscopic behavior observed in Monte Carlo simulations. We found that, while in most second-order assessment rules, intolerance hinders cooperation, it has the opposite (positive) effect under the simple standing rule. Furthermore, we show that, when considering memory, the stern judging rule shows the lowest values of cooperation, while stricter rules show higher cooperation levels.

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The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

Cited by 19 publications

References 69 publications

Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness

Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness

Game theory-based Routing for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Comparative Survey

Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation

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