Governança Corporativa: Fator Preponderante no Ativismo de Acionistas no Brasil

Abstract

<jats:p>RESUMO Objetivo: este trabalho verificou a relação entre o ativismo de acionistas e os elementos de governança corporativa e desempenho financeiro das empresas brasileiras selecionadas, articulando a teoria da agência e o conceito voice da teoria exit, voice, and loyalty. Métodos: o ativismo foi apurado por um índice constituído pelo somatório de suas ocorrências, observadas nas atas das assembleias de 2016 e 2017 das cem empresas de capital aberto da amostra. Fatores de governança e desempenho corresponderam aos anos de 2015 e 2016, coletados via Economática®. Aplicou-se a regressão quantílica (RQ) e os resultados foram comparados com a regressão por mínimos quadrados ordinários (MQO). Resultados: houve melhor adequação da RQ frente ao método de MQO, sugerindo que a governança afeta negativamente o ativismo e que seus efeitos são heterogêneos nas diferentes partes de sua distribuição. Resultados inconclusivos foram obtidos para variáveis de desempenho. Testes de robustez indicaram melhor capacidade explicativa para observações de ativismo em empresas posicionadas nos últimos 20% mais altos do índice. Conclusão: foram encontradas evidências significativas de relação entre ativismo e governança, o que não ocorre de forma conclusiva com relação a desempenho, revelando o predomínio da primeira variável.</jats:p>

Poison pills e governança corporativa: um estudo no mercado acionário brasileiro

“…In a complementary manner, the positive and statistically significant association between Level 2 and the adoption of poison pills could be explained due to the companies listed in this segment (like those listed in the New Market) having to adopt a broader group of governance rules than Level 1, prioritizing the rights of minority shareholders as demonstrated by Almeida et al (2008). In this perspective, the greater level of protection for investors in higher levels of governance is corroborated by Bortolon et al (2013) and Collares (2020), who just use Level 2 and the New Market as premium segments to capture the quality of corporate governance. The non-significance of the Level 1 segment with the adoption of poison pills may be related to the fact that the companies of this segment are not required to adopt practices related to protecting minority shareholders.…”

“…In a complementary manner, this proxy also makes it possible to capture various levels of investor protection, in line with the view that the extent to which mechanisms that ensure greater quality in corporate governance practices are adopted by companies through voluntary listings in premium segments, they will make actions that are designed to protect investors more effective (Collares, 2020).…”

“…Poison pills are considered to be mechanisms related to the protection of shareholder rights (Gine et al, 2017) and are even included in indexes that measure the quality of corporate governance such as the G-index proposed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). In this sense, the quality of corporate governance in Brazil is considered to have been determined by various aspects, with one of them being the participation of differentiated segments of corporate governance (Almeida, Scalzer, & Costa, 2008;Bortolon et al, 2013;Dalmácio et al, 2013;Collares, 2020) which have a gradual focus on the levels of investor protection, and it is expected that companies listed in these segments have a greater propensity to voluntarily adopt devices that seek to protect their shareholders such as poison pills.…”

“…In line with previous studies which have used the listing in special B3 segments as a proxy for the quality of corporate governance (Almeida et al, 2008;Bortolon et al, 2013;Dalmácio et al, 2013;Caixe & Krauter, 2014;Manoel, Moraes, Nagano, & Sobreiro, 2018;Collares, 2020), we used the dummies New Market, Level 2 and Level 1 as explanatory variables.…”

Principal-principal conflicts leading to activism of a large government-owned investor in Brazil

“…The low activism of institutional investors in Brazil suggests that maybe these and other factors, such as ownership concentration, ineffective institutions, and portfolio diversification motivations, prevent it (de Almeida & Leal, 2020; Vargas, Bortolon, Barros, & Leal, 2018; Sonza & Granzotto, 2018;Pereira & Leal, 2018). Finally, the difficulty to empirically verify a relationship between activism and CG can be attributed to the limitations of the methods and data employed in quantitative studies, particularly in Brazil (Maranho et al, 2020;Collares, 2020;Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2009;Gillan & Starks, 2007).…”