Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation

Abstract

It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two "systems" in the mind: one system (System 1) is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other (System 2) is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher-order cognition. I use the term "reflectivism" to capture the view that conscious reflection-in the "System 2" sense-is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision-making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate alone in forming our moral decisions, but that it plays a normatively ineliminable role. In this paper, I discuss arguments that have been offered in defense of reflectivism. These arguments fit into two broad categories; let us think of them as two sides of a coin. On the first side are arguments about the efficaciousness of conscious reasoning-for example, without conscious deliberation we will make bad moral judgments and decisions. On the other side of the coin are arguments about the centrality of conscious deliberation to normative actions-for example, without conscious deliberation we are no more agential than animals or automatons. Despite their attractiveness, I argue that these arguments do not successfully establish that reflection is a necessary component of good moral judgment and decision-making. If I am right, the idea that good moral judgment and decision-making can result from entirely automatic and subconscious processes gains traction. My goal in this paper is to show that reflectivism fails to include the full range of cases of moral decision-making and that a theory of automaticity may do a better job. I briefly discuss at the end of the paper how an account of successful automatic moral judgment and decision-making might begin to take shape.

Analysis and Intuition Effectiveness in Moral Problems

“…In line with Zhong (2011), it implies that intuition is crucial in judging ethical dilemmas, because a primarily analytical approach may bias the multifaceted nature of the moral problem. It is also consistent with the work by Railton (2014) and Ferrin (2017), who see the benefits of intuition particularly in the capacity to process implicit information or implicitly held moral values. At the same time, however, our framework goes beyond these studies, as it represents a systematic approach that highlights the benefits of both analytical and intuitive approaches, and identifies criteria for their respective problem-based effectiveness.…”

“…Railton (2014) regards intuitive judgments effective due to their capacity to process implicit information. In a similar vein, Ferrin (2017) stresses that intuitive judgments may be correct and robust because they are grounded in implicitly held moral values. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of systematic approaches that allow predictions about the conditions under which a moral problem should be judged analytically and when intuition is the more promising approach.…”

Cognitive Moral Based on Civics Education Material in Elementary School

“…An individual who tries to make a decision in a dilemma can drift into a story situation, so decision-making is often missed by logical value. Decision-making in the real dilemma of reflecting personality is when it reflexes shortly after learning the problems faced in the story [18]. Individual decision-making is unique and diverse.…”

Bounded reflectivism and epistemic identity

“…We can call such philosophers reflectivists (Ferrin 2017). Consider a selection of reflectivism's history.…”

“…Many philosophers take reflection to be crucial for obtaining various intellectual goods. We can call such philosophers reflectivists (Ferrin 2017). Consider a selection of reflectivism's history.…”