Globalised rebellion: the Darfur insurgents and the world

Abstract

This article is concerned with the rebellion in Darfur as a way to illustrate the politics of insurgency in the era of globalisation. We first show how the Darfur rebels have projected their struggle onto the world stage, before examining the effects that this has engendered. On the one hand, Darfur's global profile solidified the rebels' cause and co-opted international actors in support of it. This translated into real leverage for the rebels, and it constrained the Sudanese government by reducing its ability to use brute force. At the same time, internationalisation encouraged the Darfur rebels to make maximalist demands at the expense of articulating a broader political vision addressing the root causes of conflict. Moreover, the substitution of local legitimacy for international connections lowered the barriers of entry for new groups and thus promoted fragmentation. The combination of these effects makes for intractable conflict scenarios, the current situation in Darfur being a case in point.

Non-governmental organizations coalition in influencing global agenda

“…in early 2003, they began to launch insurgencies against the government. SLM/A was an armed political group attacking government troops they were comprised of members of ethnic groups which had settled in Sudan (Jumbert & Lanz 2013). The initial response of the local authorities in Darfur was to initiate a peaceful solution but their attempt at doing this yielded no results.…”

“…This attack was described by the SLM/A as a protest against the government for the marginalization and underdevelopment within the region and the government failure to protect the locals from attacks by nomadic groups. In this case, Khartoum had the key responsibility to protect Darfur citizens from atrocities but "flagrantly and willfully flouted its responsibility" (Bellamy 2013, Jumbert & Lanz 2013, Jumbert 2014.…”

“…The report prepared by this panel received approvals from AI, ICG, and HRW (Nick 2012). Darfur AI, ICG, and HRW pointed out the failure of the international community to respond to the Darfur crisis (Bellamy 2013, Jumbert & Lanz 2013, Jumbert 2014. They acknowledged that even if the government had failed to act, there was no excuse for the international community inability to implement the principle of Responsibility to Protect.…”

“…This commission began deliberation on the need to reduce the rate of conflict in the region. At this time, it was emphatically stated that if Africa was to ever experience any meaningful development, a lot of mechanisms needed to be implemented to reduce conflicts (Bellamy 2013, Jumbert & Lanz 2013, Jumbert 2014). In the following years, the mission of the African Union expanded to over 7,000 troops in Darfur.…”

Delegation, Sponsorship, and Autonomy: An Integrated Framework for Understanding Armed Group–State Relationships

“…Tamm 2020). Easy availability of external resources or excessive attention to foreign audiences can lead groups to neglect domestic constituencies and lose support (Jumbert and Lanz 2013;Weinstein 2007). A "safe haven" may also turn into a liability for a sponsored armed group if the host state fears retaliation from the group's foreign target more than it values the group (Carter 2012).…”