Germany, Afghanistan, and the Future of NATO

Abstract

The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2007-08 has meant that NATO and its international security assistance force (ISAF) have had to evolve into a counterinsurgency operation in more and more parts of the country. Its chances of an easy victory are slim. According to official United Nations documents, neither ISAF nor the Afghan authorities have provided sufficiently security, with the result that the political and economic reconstruction process is faltering. The Taliban, related armed groups, and the drug economy represent fundamental threats to still-fragile political, economic, and social institutions. Despite tactical successes by national and international military forces, anti-government elements are far from defeated. Thirty-six out of 376 districts, including most districts in the east, southeast, and south, remain largely inaccessible to Afghan officials and aid workers. Markus Kaim is head of the European and Atlantic security division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. He was visiting professor of German and European studies at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto in 2007-08. He has published widely on transatlantic security relations, NATO-EU relations, and EU common foreign and security policy.

Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan

“…The decision was pressing because nine German soldiers had recently been killed in Afghanistan-a mission that few Germans had ever considered to be in their national interest. 13 Although the casualties did not seem to influence the initial thinking of German government officials, they had their real effect on public opinion. The German government also took criticism for its support of the US in Afghanistan because members of the German public believed that American foreign policy posturing on Iraq was encouraging attacks by the Taliban.…”

Deutschlands Rolle in Afghanistan: State-Building-Dilemmata einer Zivilmacht

“…In der Literatur wird das Interventionsverhalten der Bundesrepublik in Afghanistan bislang primär durch zwei Faktoren erklärt: a) den Forderungen der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft, insbesondere der NATO-Partner nach bündnispolitischer Solidarität und verstärkter militärischer Beteiligung (Hommelhoff 2007;Kaim 2008Kaim , 2010Merz 2007;) und b) den gesellschaftlichen Präferenzen für einen zurückhalten-den Einsatz militärischer Gewalt als Ausdruck einer historisch gewachsenen "Kultur der Zurückhaltung" (Eichhorst et al 2008;Lombardi 2008;Löfflmann 2008;Meiers 2010, S. 213;von Krause 2011).…”