Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan

Abstract

This article analyzes the Government of Canada’s decision to lobby the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to lead the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003. Although studies have been conducted on Canada's choice to deploy to Kandahar province, the decision to lobby NATO, and the diplomatic efforts that resulted, have been given little attention. In addition, Ottawa’s decision to propose joint leadership of the mission with Germany in 2003 warrants further study. This article considers three key motivations evident in the Canadian government’s thinking—first, its view of deployment to Afghanistan as an alternative to deployment to Iraq; second, its interest in developing relations with Germany; and finally, its more general motivation to return to the conflict.

Alliance Value and Status Enhancement: Canada's Disproportionate Military Burden Sharing in Afghanistan

“…It has been widely acknowledged that one of Canada's main motivations for taking part in the combat operations in Afghanistan was to strengthen its bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as to ensure that NATO remains a viable transatlantic security institution (Fitzsimmons ; Massie ; Saideman ; Willis ). To illustrate this point, it is important to recall that Canada was the first ally to suggest that NATO's Article 5 should be invoked following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 in New York and Washington (Goldenberg , 284).…”

“…In addition to offering to lead ISAF, Defense Minister McCallum recommended to Rumsfeld bringing ISAF under NATO command (Cellucci ). He made tenacious efforts to rally allies' support for NATO's direct participation in ISAF, which at that point was not assured due to resistance by certain EU countries, including France (Fitzsimmons , 311).…”

“…Making the war in Afghanistan a collective responsibility for NATO would alleviate Canadian fears of being entangled open‐endedly in Afghanistan, help secure guarantees of allied support for Canada's contingent, and provide Canada with indispensable security, command and control, intelligence, and logistics support. As a side effect, it would help avoid perceptions of U.S. military unilateralism (Fitzsimmons ). Canada's military support to the war in Afghanistan thus owed much to the high valorization of the transatlantic alliance; there was a sense of path dependency in Canada's engagement in Afghanistan.…”

“…A year later, when the Canadian army sought a “pause” due to a high operational tempo of deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces, the Chrétien government decided to partially withdraw its contingent from NATO's Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina to free‐up troops for a second mission in Afghanistan. This allowed Canadians to take command of ISAF's stability mission in Kabul in 2003, a mission that was perceived as commensurate with Canada's status (Fitzsimmons ). As then Defense Minister John McCallum's stated, this “was a real opportunity for Canada to show international leadership” (Stein and Lang , 71).…”

Un poids décisif? L’influence du Québec sur les interventions militaires canadiennes

“…Comme le souligne Frank Harvey : « In fact, had Heinbecker honestly believed at the time that Saddam did not pose a threat, or had no WMD to worry about or dismantle, then Canada's decision to push the Heinbecker compromise would have been a huge strategic blunder that could have dragged the country into the Iraq war 72 ». il aurait été difficile pour le Canada de ne pas participer à une guerre contre l'irak si le compromis canadien avait bel et bien été accepté par ses alliés 73 .…”