Game Theoretical Approach to Conflict Resolution in Transboundary Water Resources Management

Eleftheriadou, Eleni; Mylopoulos, Y.

doi:10.1061/(asce)0733-9496(2008)134:5(466)

Cited by 48 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The most popular solution concept of modern game theory is Nash equilibrium when each strategy is the best response to the other players' strategies. At the point of Nash equilibrium all players profit most (i.e., have high payoffs), taking into account all possible moves of the counter-players (Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos, 2008).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rogers (1969) applied game theoretic approach to the disputed Ganges Brahmaputra Basin that involved different water uses by India and Pakistan, suggesting a range of strategies of cooperation offering significant benefits to each. The more recent works include studies of the Nile River Basin (Wu, 2001), the Jordan River Basin (Luterbacher and Wiegandt, 2002), the Euphrates and Tigris (Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmen, 2004), the Nestos/Mesta River Basin (Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos, 2008), the Orange Senqu River Basin (Siehlow et al, 2011), the Mekong River Basin (Houba et al, 2012) or the Aral Sea Basin (Ambec et al, 2013). Some authors took into account specific conditions in context of water distribution.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

Melnikovová¹

2017

Acta Univ. Agric. Silvic. Mendelianae Brun.

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This paper focuses on methods to resolve the ongoing conflict between countries in the Syrdarya Basin, namely Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, over water allocation. It addresses the problem by using the cooperative games framework. It identifies difficulties of choosing the most suitable solution to the Nash bargaining problem under the current circumstances and also reveals complications that may obstruct negotiations on water allocation. The latter is done by using a simplified model from a different subject field which explains why the negotiations have sequential character. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is recommended as optimal in the concrete situation because it takes into account efficiency of water use of the involved parties and its sequential use leads to a Pareto-optimal outcome. Also a compromise between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and dictator solutions can be considered for the current case.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

Melnikovová¹

2017

Acta Univ. Agric. Silvic. Mendelianae Brun.

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“…Flinn & Guise (1970), Vaux & Howitt (1984), Booker & Young (1994) and are examples of water resources allocation studies via optimization models. Rogers (1969Rogers ( , 1993, , Kucukmehmetoglu & Guldmann (2004, Kucukmehmetoglu (2009Kucukmehmetoglu ( , 2012, , Wu & Whittington (2006), Eleftheriadou & Mylopoulos (2008), and Teasley & McKinney (2011) are examples of both optimization and game theoretic approaches to transboundary water resources allocations.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Transboundary Water Resources Allocation under Various Parametric Conditions: The Case of the Euphrates & Tigris River Basin

Küçükmehmetoğlu

Geymen

2014

Water Resour Manage

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe literature on transboundary water resources allocation modeling is still short on encompassing and analyzing complex geographic multiparty nature of basins. This study elaborates the Inter Temporal Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model (ITETRBM), which is a linear programming based transboundary water resources allocation model maximizing net economic benefit from allocation of scarce water resources to energy generation, urban, and agricultural uses. The elaborations can be categorized in two directions: First, agricultural and urban demand nodes are spatially identified with their relative elevations and distances to water resources supplies (dams, reservoirs, and lakes). Digital elevation model (DEM) database are intensely processed in geographic information system (GIS) environment. Second, the agricultural irrigable lands are restructured into a pixel based decision making units (DMUs) in order to be able to see the spatial extent of optimally irrigated land, and then optimization program is converted from linear programming (LP) to a mixed integer programming (MIP). The model applications are designed to cover a series of sensitivity analyses encompassing the various transboundary management, energy and agricultural use value, and transportation cost scenarios over the optimal uses of the Euphrates and Tigris Basin (ETRB) resources. The model results are visually presented via GIS in order to show the transboundary upstream and downstream spatial impacts of these selected parameters. The findings are i) system parameters significantly alter the spatial extent of water resources allocation in the ETRB, and ii) the magnitudes of the parameters also explains the tradeoffs between agriculture and energy sectors as much as upstream and downstream water uses of countries.

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“…Examples have been extensively explored by Coleman & Tangermann (1998);Coleman & Tangermann, (1999);Just and Netanyahu (2000). The use of game theory to understand the choices available to policy actors -and thereby the means by which successful implementation of policy can be accomplished -has been undertaken by a variety of scholars, (Frisvold and Caswell, 2000;Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos (2008).…”

Section: Implicating Game Theory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Information? A Game Theoretic Contribution to Understanding the Development of an Indicators Policy for the UK Construction Industry

Rigby

Dewick

Courtney³

et al. 2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn the UK over the last decade, benchmarking has been consistently promoted as a solution to the problems of industry and the construction industry in particular. Government support of benchmarking in construction through the development of a key performance indicators programme found justification in the public goods aspects of the innovation process and because of the presence of market failures of information facing construction clients. However, attempts to merge benchmarking approaches into a single framework did not lead to a combined programme as intended. A game theoretic analysis of the implementation of government policy is presented to account for difficulties encountered by policy actors and to explain why a suitable mechanism to facilitate mutual benchmarking could not be devised. A key performance indicator (KPI) system that supports clients and suppliers in any sectorhere we consider construction -is highly problematic, not only because the types of information and types of processes that generate the information used by clients and suppliers are generally different, but because the exchange of information between 4 suppliers and clients and vice versa potentially leads to loss of commercially valuable information.

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Game Theoretical Approach to Conflict Resolution in Transboundary Water Resources Management

Cited by 48 publications

References 13 publications

Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

Transboundary Water Resources Allocation under Various Parametric Conditions: The Case of the Euphrates & Tigris River Basin

The Limits of Information? A Game Theoretic Contribution to Understanding the Development of an Indicators Policy for the UK Construction Industry

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