In Post-Soviet Central Asia, China is emerging as one of the most influential players as a result of an overall increase in its global role. The Central Asian region forms a crucial part of the Belt and Road Initiative thanks to its strategic location and natural wealth. Relations between China and Central Asian countries have been developing very dynamically over the past two decades and China has had a substantial impact on the five economies. Although the Chinese approach is quite cautious regarding politics and security, there is much greater interest in the economic side, most significantly in energy and infrastructure. The purpose of this study is to explore the key issues behind China’s economic presence in the region and to determine subsequent challenges for Central Asian countries. The methodology consists of an analysis of Chinese investment characteristics in order to understand the economic consequences of the superpower’s involvement in Central Asia.
The present paper aims to demonstrate how the state land ownership affects development of agricultural sector in Uzbekistan, and what are its strengths and weaknesses. It highlights the importance of secure land right regardless of ownership. Land in Uzbekistan is state-owned; the exclusive state ownership of land was first incorporated in the 1992 Constitution. The official rationale was to ensure food security and social stability; another concern was the state-run irrigation system, operation of which would be hampered in the event of land privatization. Farming entities in Uzbekistan possess different rights to land: from long-life inheritable rights of the dehkans (small-scale household farms) to rights limited by 30 to 50 years and defined by lease contracts of the private farmers. The latter are monitored by the state and are subject to state interventions; in the first place they have to carry the burden of state quotas for cotton and wheat and they are obliged to sell these crops for state-dictated prices. Dehkans provide a major part of livestock production and they can, unlike private farmers, sell all their production at market prices. Land tenure rights in Uzbekistan lack certain qualities that would make land tenure rights meaningful. The duration of land rights is sufficient, however they do not assure the holders that rights will be recognized and enforced at low costs and do not provide them with mechanisms allowing adjustment under changing conditions.The authors conclude that the insufficient land tenure security, which is further undermined by state interventions, poses a significant barrier impeding development in the agricultural sector. The paper identifies opportunities for change arising from the gradual strengthening of market principles.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the current confl ict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over shared water resources, and propose an adequate solution. The tensions between the two countries are associated with the completion of a huge dam on a river on the Tajik territory. Such construction may have a negative impact on Uzbekistan's irrigation needs since it may restrict infl ow to the Amudarya River which is Uzbekistan's key water resource. While Tajikistan intends to use water for hydropower, Uzbekistan needs water mainly for its cotton fi elds. This paper analyses the background, benefi ts and risks of the dam, roots of the tension, and suggests methods of resolving them. Based on the current dispute, the problem of shared water resources is generalized, discussed and two complementary approaches are presented. The international water law off ers a set of guidelines applicable on transboundary water confl icts; the signifi cance of the 1997 UN Convention concerning the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses is emphasized. Another instrument to grasp this problem is the game theory. The water allocation problem can be described using the Nash bargaining solution. This paper demonstrates that both approaches can contribute to resolving existing disputes over shared water resources.
This paper focuses on methods to resolve the ongoing conflict between countries in the Syrdarya Basin, namely Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, over water allocation. It addresses the problem by using the cooperative games framework. It identifies difficulties of choosing the most suitable solution to the Nash bargaining problem under the current circumstances and also reveals complications that may obstruct negotiations on water allocation. The latter is done by using a simplified model from a different subject field which explains why the negotiations have sequential character. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is recommended as optimal in the concrete situation because it takes into account efficiency of water use of the involved parties and its sequential use leads to a Pareto-optimal outcome. Also a compromise between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and dictator solutions can be considered for the current case.
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