Functions and Goal Directedness

Abstract

We examine two approaches to functions: etiological and forward-looking. In the context of functions, we raise the question, familiar to philosophers of mind, about the explanatory role of properties that are not supervenient on the mere dispositional features of a system. We first argue that the question has no easy answer in either of the two approaches. We then draw a parallel between functions and goal directedness. We conclude by proposing an answer to the question: The explanatory importance of nonsupervenient properties (like having the function of doing something, or like being goal-directed) does not lie in any special causal mechanism through which these properties bring about their effects; it lies rather in the different classification of the explananda types that these properties generate.

Confusion and dependence in uses of history

“…13 One thing most if not all of them have in common along with the other parts of exhibit (B) is an absence of historical properties in their research. Enc and Adams (1992), Enc (1995), Elder (1995Elder ( , 1996 and Ariew (2003) all affirm premise 2 from the argument above and claim that we cannot successfully predict or explain the causal behavior of certain psychological and biological subjects without adequate understanding of the relevant historical properties leading up to that behavior. The research programs summarized in exhibit (B), even in their infancy, seem to provide evidence that calls into question the truth of premise 2.…”

“…3 The idea here about the connection between history and generalizations about distributions as opposed to generalizations about causal regularities is similar to Sober's (1995) claim that although natural selection explains the frequencies of traits in populations, more proximate and developmental facts about individual organisms explain why they each have the traits that they do. For related points, see Miller (1978), Garfinkel (1981), and Enc and Adams (1992).…”

“…3.3.2. Enc (1995) goes one step further than Enc and Adams (1992). Enc (1995) stops using the term 'heuristic' and redefines the supervenience base of molar behavior to include essentially the historical properties.…”

“…The disvalue of these costs, and the level of time and resources involved, will vary in accordance with technology, theoretical understanding, and research interests. Elder (1995Elder ( , 1996, Enc and Adams (1992), and Enc (1995) focus on behavior and other products of historical processes that are functional. However, we can accept the functional features of their examples without accepting their conclusions about historical properties.…”

Levels of explanation in biological psychology

“…For example (simplifying Mayr's case), the cause of migration may be said to be the physiological mechanisms in the birds' brain noticing the shorter daylight span, or the evolutionary selection for species that get moving when food supply is short. Correspondingly, philosophers of biology distinguish several notions of function that serve different explanatory interests: some explanations focus on current and future systemic function, others on historical adaptation (Amundson & Lauder, 1994;Enc & Adams, 1992;Mitchell, 1995).…”