Levels of explanation in biological psychology

Cognitive Neuroscience and Depression: Legitimate Versus Illegitimate Reductionism and Five Challenges

“…Kendler cited Caspi et al's (2003) recent discovery of a genotype-byenvironment interaction between a serotonin transporter polymorphism and life stressors in triggering depression as one example of an important patchy reduction, in this case across molecular-genetic, psychological, and social levels of analysis. By engaging in similar patchy reductions across levels of analysis, the hope is that ''bridge laws'' that connect these levels will eventually emerge (De Jong, 2002). Most or all of the articles in this Special Issue exemplify laudable efforts at patchy reductionism by striving to establish local linkages across different levels of analysis for understanding depression (e.g., among brain event-related potentials, attention, and depressive symptoms).…”

Dealing With Complexity Differently: From Interaction-Dominant Dynamics to Theoretical Plurality

“…Underneath every mechanistic description of some high-level cognitive operation is a dynamical process of selforganization and nonlinear interaction. Although it has had prominence in some formal literatures (e.g., Wan, 1990), articulating these interrelationships, and exploring their theoretical implications, remains only a broad but still-budding agenda in cognitive science (e.g., Atmanspacher & beim Graben, 2007;Bechtel, 1990;Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2006;Chemero & Silberstein, 2008;Dale et al, 2009;De Jong, 2002;Dove, 2009;Smolensky, 1990Smolensky, , 2012Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005;Tabor, 2002Tabor, , 2009Weiskopf, 2009).…”

Beyond the computational-representational brain: why affective neuroscience tells us attitudes must be explained on multiple levels

“…Instead of Marr's ( 1982 ) tripartite levels of explanation explicitly serving computationalism, the mind/brain sciences should have an epistemological landscape which respects the various levels of organization at which phenomena underlying cognition exist at and emerge from de Jong ( 2002 ). In doing so, the framework of embodied cognition can be fleshed out to emphasize the common molecular/sub-molecular levels of description that the brain shares with the environment.…”