From Committee to the Floor: Consistency in Congressional Voting

Unekis, Joseph K.

doi:10.2307/2129865

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…There is a decrease of 10.6% in the probability of total switching and of 15.3% in the likelihood of demobilizing for the most extreme legislators compared to the moderates. These findings support our expectations and are consistent with previous research (Alemán et al 2009; Bernhard and Sulkin 2013; Unekis 1978). Ideological extremists seemed to be less susceptible to competing pressures, which would contribute to consistency between committee behavior and roll‐call votes.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 94%

“…These results speak to the comparative study of vote switching and to the study of Argentine legislative politics. Comparatively, they support our contention that switching is more likely in systems with more competing principals: our data shows switching took place in 14.7% of observations, while Unekis (1978) finds an average of 8% across US congresses between 1971 and 1974. For Argentine politics, our results suggest that legislative decision‐making is not thoroughly controlled by provincial governors as the extant literature contended.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

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Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Bonvecchi

Clerici

2021

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Why do legislators switch their votes between the committee and floor stages in multiparty presidential systems? the literature on the us Congress has argued that switches are conditional on cross-cutting pressures by competing principals (i.e., party leaders and interest groups), partisanship, electoral competitiveness, ideology, seniority, and informational updates. this article argues that unlike in the us two-party system, in multiparty systems electoral competitiveness increases the likelihood of switching. additionally, the practice of switching is more likely for legislators whose competing principals are leaders with conflicting electoral interests. We test these hypotheses analyzing vote switches between committee reports and roll-call votes in the argentine Chamber of deputies. Our results indicate that legislative vote switching indeed behaves differently in multiparty than in a two-party presidential system.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 94%

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Bonvecchi

Clerici

2021

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Information flow and party influence: Theory, measurement, and policy consequences

Panning

1983

Polit Behav

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Liberal and Conservative Voting in the House of Representatives: A National Model of Representation

Schwarz¹,

Fenmore²,

Volgy³

1980

Brit. J. Polit. Sci

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Critics of the American House of Representatives frequently cite, in one form or another, a national model of representation as a basis for criticizing both the House and the behaviour of some of its individual members. One of the more familiar criticisms, for example, is that members of the House are so motivated by local or regional concerns and interests that representation in some meaningful national form is rendered almost impossible. So widely is this characterization shared that it is hardly ever asked whether or not members of the House behave in ways that would be consistent and meaningful in terms of a national model of representation.

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From Committee to the Floor: Consistency in Congressional Voting

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Information flow and party influence: Theory, measurement, and policy consequences

Liberal and Conservative Voting in the House of Representatives: A National Model of Representation

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