Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Abstract

Why do legislators switch their votes between the committee and floor stages in multiparty presidential systems? the literature on the us Congress has argued that switches are conditional on cross-cutting pressures by competing principals (i.e., party leaders and interest groups), partisanship, electoral competitiveness, ideology, seniority, and informational updates. this article argues that unlike in the us two-party system, in multiparty systems electoral competitiveness increases the likelihood of switching. additionally, the practice of switching is more likely for legislators whose competing principals are leaders with conflicting electoral interests. We test these hypotheses analyzing vote switches between committee reports and roll-call votes in the argentine Chamber of deputies. Our results indicate that legislative vote switching indeed behaves differently in multiparty than in a two-party presidential system.

Caminos al poder político: el efecto de la magnitud del distrito y la experiencia previa para las carreras políticas de congresistas en Colombia

“…Desde una perspectiva institucional, el partido político es una de las principales variables citadas para explicar la carrera ascendente en las y los legisladores (Duque Daza, 2005). Cuando los partidos políticos ejercen un fuerte control sobre las carreras políticas, suele generarse una dependencia de los líderes hacia las élites partidistas (Chasquetti, 2010;Bonvecchi y Clerici, 2022). Por lo tanto, es más probable que legisladores consideren al partido como su principal aliado para avanzar políticamente y que reflejen una disciplina partidista sólida (Kikuchi y Lodola, 2014).…”