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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Comparative Legislative Research Center is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Legislative Studies Quarterly.The extent to which electoral divisions in congressional districts correspond with the roll call behavior of members of the House of Representatives during the 1964-1973 period is the focus of the research. District results for both the presidential and congressional elections are examined. While little relationship is found with congressional election results, strong correlations are repeatedly found with the presidential election results. Moreover, what one would expect to be the most direct linkage between presidential election results and the members' roll call records-the linkage with members' roll call support for the president-is instead found to be of secondary importance, especially since 1968. A decidedly stronger relationship is seen to occur between presidential election results and members' roll call records when measured along liberal and conservative lines. This finding parallels the emergence of relatively strong ideological voting patterns within the presidential electorate between 1964-1972, and in turn suggests the likelihood that policy linkages of some importance existed between members and their districts over the period covered.

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The British House of Commons is frequently used in comparative analysis as a model of the kind of legislative institution that ratifies and legitimizes public policy decisions taken by the government. It debates but rarely does it actually legislate. Examination of the House of Commons of the 1970s reveals a very different legislature, one that regularly overturns the government on significant policy matters. Furthermore, backbench members of the government's own parliamentary party frequently join coalitions to defeat the government in standing committee and on the floor. The research describes the development of the House of Commons as a decision-making unit in the 1970s, compares its record during the 1970s to the workings of the Commons over preceding decades, and examines various factors that help explain why the behavior of the House and its members changed so over the recent decade.

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