Free riding-aware forwarding in Content-Addressable Networks

Böhm, Klemens; Buchmann, Erik

doi:10.1007/s00778-005-0175-3

Cited by 14 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…[4] address free-riding in such structured P2P systems [4], by extending the CAN protocol with an incentives mechanism: Each peer collects information on the interactions with neighboring peers that have satisfied it. They show [4], both analytically and by simulation, that the protocol proposed discriminates well between cooperative and uncooperative peers. However, this result is based on several assumptions that are relatively stiff.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives engineering for structured P2P systems - a feasibility demonstration using economic experiments

Schosser

Böhm

Vogt

2006

Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

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Structured peer-to-peer systems allow to administer large volumes of data. Several peers collaborate to generate a query result. Analyses of unstructured peer-to-peer systems, namely of those for file-sharing, show that peers tend to shirk collaboration. We anticipate similar behavior in structured peer-to-peer systems.Recently, protocols to counter uncooperative behavior in such systems have been proposed. This article examines the behavior of peers under such protocols, using game theory. A first result of this paper is a set of hypotheses, e.g.: Peers answer queries if more than a certain percentage of their queries is answered. In many situations, free-riding does not lead to a break-down of the system. Trust, reciprocity and reputation building via a feedback mechanism are behavioral motives that increase cooperation. As a second step, we have conducted economic experiments with human participants to validate our predictions. Such experiments are important because we do not need to make any assumptions regarding the behavior of peers. It turns out that the predictions remain valid in these experiments.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives engineering for structured P2P systems - a feasibility demonstration using economic experiments

Schosser

Böhm

Vogt

2006

Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

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“…In structured P2P systems, peers might also neither not hold nor maintain routing tables nor route request packets (Gupta and Somani, 2004a;Böhm and Buchmann, 2007).…”

Section: Specific Incentives -Targeting Specific Systems and Applicatmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey of incentive mechanisms in static and mobile P2P systems

Haddi

Benchaïba

2015

Journal of Network and Computer Applications

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“…This allows to guarantee that the data object with a given key is found within a certain number of steps, under several model assumptions [2]. Structured peer-to-peer networks require a hash function that maps keys to coordinates of an ndimensional space.…”

Section: Content Addressable Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The free riding problem in structured peer-to-peer systems has not received much attention so far. An exception is the variant of Content Addressable Networks described in [2]. With the approach proposed there, peers remember which interactions with other peers have satisfied them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Strategic Properties of Peer-to-Peer Data Structures and Behaviour of Human Peers in Economic Experiments

Schosser

Böhm

Vogt

2006

22nd International Conference on Data Engineering Workshops (ICDEW'06)

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Structured peer-to-peer networks manage large data sets. Each peer administers a part of the data. To answer a query, several peers must collaborate. However, experience with peer-to-peer file sharing systems shows that peers tend to abandon collaboration. Such behaviour is also expected in structured peer-to-peer systems. In the recent past, protocols for such systems to counter this kind of behaviour have been proposed. Our objective is to investigate how the behaviour of peers reacts to such protocols. We use idealized game theoretic models to analyze the strategic properties of structured peer-to-peer networks. The models predict cutoff strategies. I.e., if more than a certain percentage of their queries are answered, peers also answer queries in a stationary equilibrium. Another theoretical result is that free riding may occur in equilibrium. To check whether our theoretical predictions are in line with reality, we have implemented our model in an experimental laboratory and have analyzed the behaviour of human peers. These experiments support our theoretical results.

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Free riding-aware forwarding in Content-Addressable Networks

Cited by 14 publications

References 24 publications

Incentives engineering for structured P2P systems - a feasibility demonstration using economic experiments

Incentives engineering for structured P2P systems - a feasibility demonstration using economic experiments

A survey of incentive mechanisms in static and mobile P2P systems

Strategic Properties of Peer-to-Peer Data Structures and Behaviour of Human Peers in Economic Experiments

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